Product Intervention as a Macroprudential Tool: the Case of Catastrophe Bonds by GOLDBY, MA & Keller, A
 
Product Intervention as a Macroprudential Tool: the Case of Catastrophe Bonds 
Miriam Goldby and Anat Keller* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
One effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was to jump-start a focus on macroprudential 
supervision, a supervisory approach which adopts a birds’ eye view in assessing and addressing 
systemic threats to financial stability. Because threats to the financial system may derive not just 
from the financial reach and exposure of large systemically relevant corporations, but also from 
broader financial activity leading to the design of innovative financial products and from their 
prevalence and distribution in the financial markets, we float the hypothesis that product 
intervention powers may in future be useful to financial supervisors attempting to address 
systemic risk deriving from financial innovation and growth. We test this hypothesis by using 
the catastrophe bond markets, as a case study. 
 
Extreme climate-related events are increasing in magnitude and frequency as a result of climate 
change, and consequent losses are likewise increasing. The need to transfer these risks is leading 
to an increase in demand for insurance, but the demand is beginning to exceed the capacity of 
traditional insurance and reinsurance. This has given rise to growth in a type of beneficial 
financial innovation – the creation of instruments the function of which is to transfer these risks 
to the capital markets. The prevalence of catastrophe bonds in the financial markets is therefore 
growing, with the number of issues increasing steadily year on year and on the back of this, a 
number of cat-linked derivatives are beginning to be traded in the markets. This paper argues 
that a number of features of the design and distribution of these financial instruments may in 
future render them systemically relevant, particularly in view of the potential for significant 
common exposures to develop, which, should widespread and significant losses occur, may 
engender panic in the financial markets.  
 
This paper poses the question, in view of the potential systemic relevance of these insurance-
linked securities and derivatives, as well as their distribution, could it be that the right way to 
address these risks is through the exercise of product intervention powers rather than by other 
regulatory means? And if yes, to what extent can such powers, deriving from UK and EU law, 
be exercised for the achievement of macroprudential goals? More broadly, it asks - what lessons 
can be learnt from analysis of the cat bonds markets on product intervention as a macroprudential 
tool to prevent or mitigate the build-up of systemic risk to financial stability? 
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A. Introduction 
 
One effect of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was to jump-start a focus on macroprudential 
supervision, a supervisory approach which adopts a bird’s-eye view in assessing and addressing 
systemic threats to financial stability.1 While a major task following the crisis was to end “too-
big-to-fail”,2 threats to the financial system may derive not just from the financial reach and 
exposure of large systemically relevant corporations, but also from broader financial activity 
leading to the design of innovative financial products and from their prevalence and distribution 
in the financial markets. Thus, the massive increase in securitization activity leading to the 
issuance of mortgage- and asset-backed securities between 2000 and 2007 was a significant 
driver of the systemic problems which followed.3  
 
In this article, we float the hypothesis that product-focused supervisory tools, termed product 
intervention powers, developed in Europe following the financial crisis, permit a supervisor to 
impose restrictions on the design, use, terms, or marketing of financial products, may in future 
be useful to financial supervisors attempting to address systemic risk deriving from financial 
innovation and growth. We test this hypothesis by using the catastrophe bond (or “cat bond”) 
markets, as a case study. We explore the reasons for which these markets may expand rapidly in 
the future, how they might become a source of systemic risk, and how product intervention 
powers may serve in the hands of regulators to address these risks in an efficient and timely 
manner. 
 
Why cat bonds? Extreme climate-related events are increasing in magnitude and frequency as a 
result of climate change,4 and consequent losses, including the costs of recovery, repair and 
reinstatement after such events, are likewise increasing. The desire to transfer these risks is 
leading to an increase in demand for insurance, but the demand is beginning to exceed the 
capacity of traditional insurance and reinsurance. This has given rise to growth in a type of 
                                                
1 M Brunnermeier and others, The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Report on the World 
Economy 11, International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
June 2009, available electronically at https://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf (accessed 
20.08.2018); Bank of England Discussion Paper, ‘The Role of Macro-prudential Policy’ [2009] available 
electronically at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2009/the-role-of-macroprudential-
policy.pdf (accessed 20.08.2018); Group of Thirty (G30), ‘Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience, 
Macroprudential policy, Tools and Systems for the Future, October 2010 available electronically at 
http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_EnhancingFinancialStabilityResilience.pdf accessed 
(20.08.2018); K French and others, The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System (PUP, 2010), 34-44; S 
Hanson, A Kashyap and J Stein, ‘A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation’ (2011) 25 J of Economic 
Perspectives 3; D Schoenmaker and P Wierts, ‘Macroprudential Policy: The Need for a Coherent Policy 
Framework’ [2011] Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper 13 available electronically at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876595 (accessed 20.08.2018). 
2  A Wilmarth, ‘The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem’, (2011) 
89 Oregon Law Review, 951-1057. 
3 See for instance, E Tymoigne, ‘Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis, Part II: 
Deregulation, the Financial Crisis, and Policy Implications’ Working Paper No. 573.2 The Levy Economics Institute 
of Bard College California State University, Fresno August 2009 and J C Stein, ‘Securitization, Shadow Banking, 
and Financial Fragility’ (2010) 139 (4) Daedalus 41-51 available electronically at 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/stein/publications/securitization-shadow-banking-and-financial-fragility (accessed 
20.08.2018). 
4 See R Russell, ‘Climate change and extreme weather: Science is proving the link’, Deutsche Welle, 11th April 
2018, available electronically at https://www.dw.com/en/climate-change-and-extreme-weather-science-is-proving-
the-link/a-43323706 (accessed 10.08.2018). See also Carbon Brief, ‘Mapped: How Climate Change Affects 
Extreme Weather Around the World’, Attribution, 16th July 2017, available electronically at 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-the-world (accessed 
10.08.2018), which maps multiple academic studies attributing extreme weather to climate change. 
beneficial financial innovation – the creation of instruments the function of which is to transfer 
these risks to the capital markets. The prevalence of catastrophe bonds, a type of insurance-
linked security, in the financial markets is therefore growing, with the number of issues 
increasing steadily year on year.  Their popularity with investors is due, among other things, to 
the relatively high yield these financial instruments offer, to their low correlation with other asset 
classes and to their growing commoditization (through the use of risk-modelling and parametric 
indices). Further innovations leading to derivative products are also being proposed5 and it is 
also possible to issue cat-linked futures, swaps and options.  If these instruments are used for 
speculation, rather than for the genuine transfer of risk, this innovation may eventually develop 
the potential to multiply exponentially the financial impact of catastrophic events.  
 
Indeed, a number of features of the design and distribution of these financial instruments may in 
future render them systemically relevant, particularly in view of the potential for significant 
common exposures to develop, which, should widespread and significant losses occur, may 
engender panic in the financial markets. 
 
Due to the fact that cat bonds to date remain a relatively niche product, they have not so far 
featured in any systemically significant market activity. However, investor reactions to the 
Alberta Wildfires of 20166 and to the Harvey7 and Irma8 Hurricanes in August and September 
2017 can give an indication of the kind of impact which more widespread holdings and extensive 
exposures could have, especially should a “black swan”9 natural catastrophe occur. In particular, 
even before Hurricane Irma struck Florida, ‘[t]he Swiss Re catastrophe bond price return index 
suffered its biggest drop since at least 2002, tumbling 16 per cent … from the previous week.’10 
 
This paper poses the question, in view of the potential systemic relevance of the product itself 
and its distribution, could it be that the right way to address these risks is through the exercise of 
product intervention powers rather than by other regulatory means? And if yes, to what extent 
can these powers be exercised for this purpose in the UK? More broadly, it asks – what lessons 
does an analysis of the cat bonds market offer regarding the role of product intervention as a 
macroprudential tool to prevent or mitigate the build-up of systemic risk to financial stability? 
 
The rest of the article is in four sections. Section B gives an overview of insurance-linked 
securities (ILS) and cat-bonds as products of securitisation activity, including an explanation of 
the structure and triggers of the latter. It also discusses the features in the design and distribution 
of cat bonds that may potentially make them systemically significant in the future, and therefore 
of interest to macroprudential supervisors, who, we argue, fail to monitor trends and 
developments in this market at their peril. Section C explains product intervention powers and 
                                                
5 See for example the proposal for contingent convertible catastrophe bonds (CoCoCat) in K Burnecki, M N 
Giuricich and Z Palmowski, ‘Valuation of contingent convertible catastrophe bonds - the case for equity 
conversion’, Cornell University Library, arXiv:1804.07997v1 [q-fin.PR], 21st Apr 2018, available electronically 
at https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.07997v1 (accessed 20.08.2018). 
6 Artemis, Fort McMurray wildfire insurance loss up slightly to C$4.7bn: PCS, 17th August 2016 available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2016/08/17/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-insurance- loss-up-slightly-to-
c4-7bn-pcs/ (accessed 09.09.2017) and Artemis, ILS fund & sidecar losses likely ahead of plan in 2016: Panelists, 
available electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2016/07/08/ils-fund-sidecar-losses-likely-ahead-of-plan-in-
2016-panelists/ (accessed 09.09.2017). 
7 Artemis, Cat bond market drops on Harvey, close shave for Fonden 2017 deal?, 28th August 2017, available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/08/28/cat-bond-market-drops-on-harvey-close-shave-for-
fonden-multicat-deal/ (accessed 29.08.2017). See esp. reference to ‘an investor offloading their stake in these bonds 
in case of a loss.’ 
8 See S Platt and N Bullock, ‘Investors in Catastrophe Bonds flee Irma Fury’, Financial Times, 8th September 2017. 
9 See N N Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Penguin, 2008). 
10 Platt and Bullock (n 8). 
the reasons why they may be a good option for addressing systemic risks deriving from trends 
in the design and distribution of cat bonds. Section D evaluates the product intervention powers 
at the disposal of the UK financial regulatory authorities under current law and assesses the extent 
to which these powers may be used for macroprudential purposes. Section E concludes. 
 
While adopting cat bonds as a financial product case study and focussing mainly on the powers 
currently available to the UK regulator for evaluative purposes, this article has wider 
implications. By giving an example of products which may at present be non-systemic but which 
have the potential to become so in future, and analysing how new regulatory powers may be 
harnessed to address emerging dangerous trends as they are identified, it points to wider 
implications for macroprudential supervision. In particular, it represents a case-study of how 
macroprudential supervisors may be innovative in achieving their mandates. 
 
 
B. Background 
 
B.1 Insurance-linked securities and cat bonds 
 
Insurance-Linked Securities (ILS) are an alternative to traditional reinsurance, a device for 
alternative risk transfer (ART). In traditional reinsurance, an underwriter of reinsurance agrees 
to pay specified types and amounts of underwriting loss incurred by an insurer in return for a 
premium, resulting in the insurer “laying off” risk to the reinsurer. The reinsurance contract may 
be facultative in that it covers an individual risk exposure or a treaty, which covers multiple risk 
exposure. By contrast, when ILS are issued, risk originating in the insurance market is transferred 
to the capital markets. ART products are typically collaterized by the capital from investors. 
Typical investors in such products are hedge funds and pension funds. ILS are rated for risk of 
default by Credit Rating Agencies. They pay periodic coupons to investors which consist of a 
risk-free return plus a spread that depends on the risk of default and market conditions at time of 
issue. The principal is at risk following a trigger event. A semi-liquid secondary market exists 
facilitated by specialist broker-dealers. A large proportion of the ILS market consists of cat 
bonds, but there are other types mainly linked to life risk (including embedded value 
securitization, extreme mortality securitization, life settlements securitization, longevity swaps 
and reserve funding securitization). Very recently there have been suggestions that cyber-risk 
will be securitized in the future, and there is much hype around the possibilities that this 
presents.11 The current size of the ILS market is small but growing steadily as may be seen from 
figure 1 below. 
 
 
  
                                                
11 See Artemis, Capital markets a natural fit for cyber risks, as evidenced by WannaCry, 18th May 2017, available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/05/18/capital-markets-a-natural-fit-for-cyber-risks-as-
evidenced-by-wannacry/ (accessed 09.09.2017); R Amaral, Cyber Risks and ILS, Risk & Insurance, 15th October 
2016, available electronically at http://riskandinsurance.com/cyber-risks-ils/ (accessed 09.09.2017); BNY Mellon, 
Insurance Linked Securities: Cyber Risk, Insurers and the Capital Markets, White Paper, April 2016, available 
electronically at https://www.bnymellon.com/emea/en/our-thinking/insurance-linked-securities-cyber-risk-and-
the-capital-markets.jsp (accessed 09.09.2017). 
Figure 1 
Issued/Outstanding ILS Q2 201812 
 
 
 
Source: Artemis 
 
 
B.1.1 Cat bond structures 
 
Catastrophe bonds (or “cat bonds”) are a popular type of ILS and a means for insurers to transfer 
the risk of property losses caused by natural catastrophes. A cat bond is issued by a sponsor, 
usually an insurer wishing to transfer risks that exceed its carrying capacity. Figure 2 below gives 
a visual representation of a typical cat bond structure.13 
 
In a cat bond, premiums are transferred by the sponsor to the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to 
which the risk is also being transferred contractually. The SPV issues the bonds and receives the 
capital from the bond-buying investors.14 This capital is held in a collateral trust, and invested in 
(typically triple A-rated, low-risk) securities. The coupon paid to investors derives from the 
premium paid by the sponsor to the SPV as well as the returns from these securities. 
 
  
                                                
12 Artemis, Catastrophe Bond and ILS issued and outstanding by year, available electronically at 
http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/cat_bonds_ils_issued_outstanding.html (accessed 02.07.2018). 
13 See also G Etherington and D Kendall, ‘What are the Risks of Insurance Linked Securities?’ (November 2013) 
Zeitschrift fuer Versicherungswesen 689-690. 
14 Risk Management Solutions, Cat Bonds Demystified: RMS Guide to the Asset Class (2012) available 
electronically at http://forms2.rms.com/rs/729-DJX-565/images/cm_cat_bonds_demystified.pdf (accessed 
20.07.2016). 
Figure 2 
Typical cat bond structure15 
 
 
 
 
 
The bonds typically mature in three years and pay a quarterly coupon to investors.16 The principal 
is repaid to the investors in full upon maturity if no triggering event occurs. If a triggering event 
occurs on the other hand, the principal will be forfeited in part or in full and returns will be 
reduced or will cease entirely for the remaining period until maturity.17 Thus investors assume 
two risks peculiar to this type of investment: the first is the insured risk that has been transferred 
to them via the cat bond. The second is the credit risk of the collateralised account. The contractual 
terms governing the bond must therefore provide protection in the form of clear constraints on 
the way in which the capital may be invested by the SPV.18 
 
 
B.1.2 Cat bond triggers 
 
There are three main types of trigger around which cat bonds tend to be designed: indemnity, 
industry loss and parametric. Where the indemnity type is used, the trigger is the actual loss by 
                                                
15 Swiss Re, The Fundamentals of Insurance-Linked Securities, 6th September 2011, available electronically at 
http://www.swissre.com/library/archive/ILS__The_fundamentals_of_insurancelinked_securities.html (accessed 
17.08.2018), 7. 
16 Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 2 and 6.  
17 Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 2. 
18 Cat bonds predating the 2008-9 financial crisis made use of a total return swap (TRS) counterparty, usually an 
investment bank. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Policy Issues in 
Insurance: Risk Awareness, Capital Markets and Catastrophic Risks (OECD Publishing, 12 August 2011), 108: ‘A 
TRS converts the interest earned on the collateral investments to a LIBOR or EURIBOR basis, and the swap 
counterparty assumes the credit risk and the liquidations/spread risk of the underlying assets.... [T]he swap 
counterparty guarantees both the LIBOR or EURIBOR based interest rate and the full return of the principal. Thus, 
principal defaults would occur only if both the counterparty and the collateral defaulted.’ ‘During the last quarter of 
2008 … a number of CAT bonds were directly affected by the global crisis due to the loss of their [TRS] 
counterparty as a result of the failure of Lehman Brothers.’ (Ibid.) In contrast with the pre-crisis cat bonds ‘most 
recent deals impose strict prudential rules on how the collateral is invested, feature daily mark-to-market accounting 
on the collateral accounts and “top-up” requirements in the event that asset values fall before par.’ (Ibid, 108). See 
also Etherington and Kendall (n 13), 690. 
the insurer as a result of the occurrence of the insured peril (i.e. a specified catastrophic event, 
in a specified geographic region for a specified line of business). This type of bond is the closest 
in nature to traditional reinsurance, providing full protection to the sponsor, but requires an 
extensive and carefully conceived contractual framework, particularly as regards loss definitions. 
From the point of view of investors, information regarding the risk they are actually assuming will 
not be easily accessible – it is likely to be unfeasible for them to inform themselves fully about 
every policy the risk covered by which is being transferred or to judge the quality of the sponsor’s 
underwriting decisions. In addition, once the trigger occurs, settlement of claims by the insurer 
(which determines the loss to be indemnified) is likely to take considerable time, necessitating 
an extension of the bond beyond maturity, which can be detrimental to insurers. Finally, this type 
of cat bond creates the risk of moral hazard on the part of the insurer, who may take payout 
decisions carelessly, as the cost of the payout will ultimately be passed on to the cat-bond 
investor. 
 
In an industry-loss triggered bond, the investors forfeit the principal on the basis of losses 
experienced by the insurance industry as a whole following the occurrence of the insured peril. 
The loss is established by reference to the total loss experienced by the industry following a 
natural catastrophe. This type of bond structure therefore assumes that the sponsor’s portfolio is 
in line with those of the industry in general. If the bond is triggered the sponsor recovers a 
percentage of total industry losses. While published estimates of industry losses are available at 
an early stage,19 (meaning that investors have more clarity as to the consequences for their 
investment when a catastrophe occurs), it can still take considerable time for the official loss to 
be released, leading to comparable potential for delay as for an indemnity cat bond. 
 
In a parametric cat bond structure, triggers consist of the physical characteristics of a catastrophic 
event, e.g. an earthquake of a certain magnitude or higher within a certain geographical area. In 
order to determine whether a parametric bond has been triggered by a catastrophic event or not, 
the parameters of the event are entered into an index formula. The bond is triggered if the 
resulting index value is above the pre-defined trigger level threshold. It is exhausted if the value 
is above the exhaustion threshold.20 Underlying indices may be ‘transparently and objectively 
measured, available at low cost and … highly correlated with exposures to be transferred.’21 
They are prepared by third parties and are not open to manipulation by the contract parties. The 
structuring of parametric bonds can also make use of probabilistic catastrophe loss models. In a 
parametric bond the consequences of a catastrophe for investors are determinable immediately 
after the occurrence of a catastrophe. Recent reports also suggest that in the future parametric 
cat bonds can be designed as “smart contracts” using blockchain (or distributed ledger) 
technology to accelerate, simplify and reduce the costs of payment and settlement between 
insurers and investors.22 On the flip side, the insurer might not obtain coverage for its full 
exposure as compensation does not depend upon the insurer’s actual loss. This type of bond 
                                                
19 According to Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 5, ‘In the U.S. and Europe, the main accepted providers of 
insurance industry loss estimates are Property Claims Services (PCS) and PERILS, respectively. Both firms 
undertake to provide estimates of the total loss experienced by the insurance industry after a major catastrophe.’ ‘… 
first industry loss estimates from modelling companies are usually available within a couple of weeks after the 
event.’ (Ibid.) 
20 Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 5. 
21 S Chantarat, K Pannangpetch, N Puttanapong, P Rakwatin and T Tanompongphandh, Index-based Risk Financing 
and Development of Natural Disaster Insurance Programs in Developing Countries July 2012, available 
electronically at https://arefiles.ucdavis.edu/uploads/filer_public/2014/03/27/eria_paper_july2012.pdf (accessed 
20.07.2016), 3. See also OECD (n 18), 143. 
22 See J Gould ‘Allianz expects blockchain tech to expedite cat bond deals’ Insurance Journal 15th June 2016, 
available electronically at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2016/06/15/416971.htm (accessed 
15.09.2016). 
therefore is not designed to “indemnify” in the pure sense of the word, and correlation must be 
carefully assessed. 
 
 
B.2 Cat Bonds and Systemic Risk 
 
The issuance of cat bonds is an innovative way of packaging and distributing risk and as such 
they are a type of financial innovation, which generally involves the emergence of novel financial 
instruments, new financial services and new forms of organisation in financial intermediation.23 
Financial innovation holds the promise of improving efficiency in financial markets thus 
increasing overall economic welfare.24 It often allows for better risk sharing and accordingly, 
has the potential to enhance financial stability. More specifically, cat bonds broaden the 
dispersion of risk across different financial intermediaries and improve risk allocation to capital 
markets that are more willing and able to bear it. Nevertheless, with the emergence of innovative 
financial products comes also the potential for new risks to financial stability to build up. As the 
growing exposure of capital markets to cat bonds may have important implications for systemic 
risk, in a paper published in 2015 we argued that cat bonds and ILS more generally should be 
subject to macroprudential oversight or surveillance.25 
 
The macroprudential perspective focuses on the financial system as a whole as distinct from 
individual institutions and its objective is to limit the costs to the economy from financial 
distress.26 In other words, it is aimed at limiting the likelihood of failure and corresponding costs 
to a significant portion of the financial system, often referred to as limiting systemic risk. 
Macroprudential supervision emphasises, therefore, that actions that may seem reasonable or 
even desirable from the perspective of individual financial institutions may weaken system-wide 
stability and be unwelcome from a macroprudential perspective.27 This tension can be attributed 
to the fact that risks taken by individual financial institutions may be ultimately borne by the 
system as a whole, i.e. they create externalities.28 
 
The potential for these externalities to arise is evident in the context of catastrophe bonds where 
the risk originating in the insurance market is transferred to capital markets. Whilst cat bonds 
are important products that enable insurers to manage their risk more efficiently, the potential 
negative externalities would be borne by the financial system as a whole and ultimately could 
have a negative impact on the real economy. These externalities could emerge in the form of 
enhanced interconnectedness between the insurance sector, capital markets and other financial 
and sovereign entities, leading to the possibility of contagion where a trigger event materialises 
                                                
23 O Issing, ‘Opening Remarks’ (ECB Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk Fourth Joint Central Bank Research 
Conference, 8-9 November 2005), 14. 
24 R Ferguson, ‘Financial Regulation: Seeking the Middle Way’ (ECB Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, Fourth 
Joint Central Bank Research Conference, 8-9 November 2005), 51. 
25 M Goldby and A Keller, ‘Oversight of systemically relevant insurance practices within the EU: the role of macro-
prudential supervision’ Chapter 6 in A Georgosouli and M Goldby (eds), Systemic Risk and the Future of Insurance 
Regulation (Informa, 2015), 71-72. See also OECD (n 18), 155 [9.1.c. and 9.1.d.]. 
26 Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU Chaired by Jacques De Larosière, 25 February 
2009 available electronically at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
(accessed 14.09.2017) (hereinafter De Larosière Report), [147]; S Hanson, A Kashyap and J Stein, ‘A 
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation’ (2011) 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3; D 
Schoenmaker and P Weirts, ‘Macroprudential Policy: The Need for a Coherent Policy Framework’ [2011] 
Duisenberg School of Finance Policy Paper, 13. 
27 Brunnermeier et al. (n 1), 6 naming this phenomenon ‘fallacy if composition’. 
28 Brunnermeier et al. (n 1), 20; G De Nicolo, G Favara, R Larnovski, Externalities and Macroprudential Policy, 
IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/12/05, 7th June 2012, available electronically at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1205.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017). 
or an SPV defaults. The externalities could also emerge through the market channel, for example 
if, following a trigger event which affects the value of the bonds, fire sales occur with a sudden 
price drop in the secondary market. This could in itself result in disruption in the market or 
significant losses. 
 
Macroprudential supervisors may find themselves between the hammer and the anvil. On the 
one hand, they would want to encourage financial innovation that increases social welfare and 
economic growth and avoid overregulation that would stifle financial activity. On the other hand, 
given the potential systemic risk implications of innovative financial products, the 
macroprudential supervisor may want to impose limitation on the design and use of these 
products. But is the cat bonds market considered a systemically important market? 
 
The IMF/BIS/FSB report submitted to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
in October 2009 sets out three key criteria for assessing the systemic importance of financial 
institutions and financial markets and instruments: size, interconnectedness and 
substitutability.29  The report defines systemic risk as a risk of disruption to financial services 
that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential 
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.30 The size criterion refers to the 
volume of financial services provided by the individual component of the financial system, 
substitutability refers to the extent to which other components of the system can provide the same 
services in the event of a failure and interconnectedness refers to the linkages with other 
components of the system. 
 
Assessing the systemic importance of markets presents more conceptual challenges than those 
presented by the assessment in relation to individual institutions.31 On the one hand, the systemic 
importance of a market derives to an extent from that of the institutions that participate in it. On 
the other hand, the size of a market as a whole is a determinant of potential economic costs in 
the event of its malfunction. In addition, if the function of a stressed market cannot be replicated 
by other mechanisms, the economic impact of its failure can be significant. Finally, 
interconnectedness refers to markets’ interdependence on each other as well as on institutions. 
 
The IMF/BIS/FSB report suggests that an assessment based on these three criteria should be 
complemented with reference to financial vulnerabilities and the capacity of the institutional 
framework to deal with financial failures. Complexity is listed as a potential source of 
vulnerability and should be taken into account in the assessment of the systemic importance of 
cat bonds. In particular, where complexity in the context of cat bonds is associated with lack of 
transparency, it could bring about difficulties in understanding the exposures involved and the 
potential magnification of information asymmetries in the case of a systemic event.32 
 
The question arises, to what extent do these criteria apply to cat bonds? A comprehensive 
analysis of the systemic importance of cat bonds requires both assessment of quantitative 
                                                
29 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations, Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October 2009, available 
electronically at https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017) (hereinafter 
IMF/BIS/FSB 2009 Report). 
30 IMF/BIS/FSB 2009 Report (n 29), 2. 
31 IMF/BIS/FSB 2009 Report (n 29), 3 
32 IMF/BIS/FSB 2009 Report (n 23),13. See also European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) Financial Stability Report, December 2014, available electronically at https://eiopa.europa.eu/financial-
stability-crisis-prevention/financial-stability/financial-stability-reports/financial-stability-report-december-2014 
(accessed 10.09.2017) (hereinafter EIOPA FSR 2014), 28. 
indicators and qualitative judgments and is outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, several 
initial observations can be made here with respect to how the systemic risk criteria apply to cat 
bonds. 
 
 
B.2.1 Size 
 
The size of the cat bonds market is growing (see figure 1) and is expected to grow further in 
coming years. This is due to a number of factors.33 Cat bonds tend to offer a relatively high yield 
(although yields have recently been declining due to demand exceeding supply34) at a time when 
interest rates are generally depressed (although these have been showing some signs of 
recovery35). High yields have made cat bonds attractive to investors. The yields are high to 
compensate for the risk of non-repayment of part or all of the principal and the novelty for 
investors of taking insurance risk, as well as because of the comparatively higher premiums paid 
for traditional property cat reinsurance. Thus, key investors in cat bonds are pension funds that 
have been increasing in recent years their allocations to ILS in general and cat bonds in 
particular,36 as a result, amongst other things, of the pressure they are experiencing to improve 
returns.37 Another attractive feature of cat bonds is that they have low correlations with other 
asset classes,38 although the extent to which this is true will depend on how the relevant collateral 
trust funds are invested.39 Additionally, cat bonds are becoming more standardised and investors 
                                                
33 See International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), Global Insurance Market Report, January 2016 
available electronically at www.iaisweb.org/file/58465/2015-global (accessed 01.08.2017) (hereinafter GIMAR 
2016), 25. 
34 Artemis, Q2 2017 Catastrophe Bond and ILS Market Report, available electronically at 
http://www.artemis.bm/artemis_ils_market_reports/downloads/q2_2017_cat_bond_ils_market_report.pdf 
(accessed 20.08.2018) (hereinafter Artemis Q2 2017 Report), 11-13. 
35 See Bank of England, Inflation Report, August 2017 available electronically at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/2017/aug.pdf (accessed 29.08.2017), 
Charts 1.7 and 1.8. 
36 Artemis, ‘More Pension Funds Invest in ILS as Alternatives Allocations Rise: Mercer’, 7th June 2017, available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/06/07/more-pension-funds-invest-in-ils-as-alternatives-
allocations-rise-mercer/ (accessed 01.09.2017); On excessive search for yield see OECD, Pension Markets in Focus, 
2015 available electronically at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Pension-Markets-in-Focus-2015.pdf 
(accessed 14.09.2017). 
37 ‘Pension funds may also give rise to systemic risks in the U.S. financial system. While many funds are shifting 
towards defined contribution, defined benefit plans still remain almost half of the industry, and about 20 percent of 
multi-employer pension funds are underfunded. Pressure to improve returns could spur undue risk taking, whether 
via direct credit exposure or through securities lending and cash reinvestment. As noted in the 2015 FSOC Annual 
Report, the transfer of pension risk to the insurance industry, through “longevity swaps” and other insurance 
products, increases the interconnectedness of the system.’ International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States, 
Financial Sector Assessment Program and Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report no. 15/170, July 
2015, available electronically at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15170.pdf?hootPostID=0ae3d0cd6b3a481fb2805b7ab5%2083a3a
d (accessed 01.09.2017). 
38 See OECD (n 18), 138. See also J Dizard, ‘Cat Bonds Look Pretty Good after a Few Drinks’, ft.com Opinion, 5th 
August 2016. 
39 See M Savas, Cat Bonds – Correlation to Traditional Asset Classes, Entropics Asset Management, 18 December 
2016, available electronically at http://en.entropics.se/blog/cat-bonds-correlation-traditional-asset-classes/ 
(accessed 29.08.2017): 
‘The Lehman Brother[s] collapse during the 2008 financial crisis had … a negative impact on cat bonds, 
as the collateral of four cat bonds was invested in the bank. The nominal value of these bonds decreased 
and the index dropped -3.1% following the crash. The equity and bond indices fell in the same period 
about -30% and the hedge fund index dropped -18.2%.  
‘Following these events, we saw structural changes to cat bonds in order to minimise the counter party 
credit risk. As a result of the Lehman crash, the collateral is now almost exclusively invested in 
government bonds with a high credit rating, minimising correlation to traditional asset classes.’ 
are becoming more familiar and ‘comfortable’ with them.40 
 
The growth in demand for cat bonds means that the size of the market for these products is also 
growing. Artemis reports that issuance of cat bonds and ILS reached USD 9.761 billion, making 
it the most active year ever recorded.41 In the US, issuance of cat bonds during the second quarter 
of 2017 stood at a new record of USD 6.38 billion. When added to the Quarter 1, the total 
issuance in the first half of 2017 stood at USD 8.55 billion.42 
 
The end of 2017 also saw the first cat bond issue in the UK.43 Despite these figures being a tiny 
fraction of the total debt outstanding on the worldwide bond market, it is fair to say that this 
trend is worth monitoring as there is a clear movement towards greater activity in the cat bond 
market. The growth of the mortgage-backed securities market can be taken as an illustration of 
how a securities market can expand rapidly from modest beginnings without real systemic 
implications to become a behemoth that can, in combination with other factors, bring an entire 
financial system to a halt, having radical effects on the real economy. The market expanded 
relatively gradually through the 1990s reaching USD 1 trillion in 2001, but quadrupling in size 
over just two years between 2001 and 2003, when it reached USD 4 trillion.44 
 
 
B.2.2 Interconnectedness 
 
Cat bonds transfer insurance risks to non-insurance firms (i.e. to the capital markets). This in 
turn increases the interconnectedness between the sectors and their susceptibility to common 
shocks.45 It can be argued that the interconnectedness of cat bonds market is increasing given the 
expanding perimeter of both issuers and investors of cat bonds in financial markets. First, cat 
bonds are not just issued by insurers such as Lloyd’s of London syndicates46  but also increasingly 
                                                
Cat bonds could therefore have a correlation with government bonds, and a sovereign debt crisis could be significant 
to their performance. 
40 On the impact of cat bonds being a novelty product see V Bantwal and H Kunreuther, ‘A Cat Bond Premium 
Puzzle?’ (2000) 1(1) Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets 76. 
41 Artemis Q2 2017 Report (n 34), 3. 
42 Aon Benfield, Insurance-Linked Securities, Q2 2017 Update available electronically at 
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/documents/040817_aon_securities_ils_q2_update.pdf (accessed 
14.09.2017) (hereinafter Aon Benfield Q2 2017 Report). According to Artemis, May 2017 was the most active 
month in the cat bond market’s history, with over USD 3.6 billion of new risk capital issued and almost USD 500 
million of maturities, with another USD 1.33 billion maturing in the first week or so of June. See ‘New Cat Bond 
Issuance Continues to Stimulate Secondary Trades in May 2017’, 19th June 2017, available electronically at 
http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/06/19/new-cat-bond-issuance-continues-to-stimulate-secondary-trades-in-may-
2017/ (accessed 14.09. 2017). See also L Scism and A Das, ‘Catastrophe Bonds Shake Up Insurance Industry’, The 
Wall Street Journal, 7th August 2017: “…there are $72 billion of cat bonds and similar investments outstanding. 
The total is equivalent to 12% of the $565 billion in capital in the reinsurance business. The volume of cat bonds 
and related investments is widely expected to double in the next several years…” 
43 Reuters, ‘Insurer Neon launches first UK catastrophe bond vehicle’, Reuters 3rd January 2018, available 
electronically at https://www.reuters.com/article/insurance-neon-ils/insurer-neon-launches-first-uk-catastrophe-
bond-vehicle-idUSL8N1OY167 (accessed 11.01.2018). 
44 For an account see N Fligstein and A Goldstein, ‘The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial 
Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown’ Department of Sociology, University of California Berkley, October 2012, 
available electronically at 
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/fligstein/The%20Transformation%20of%20Mortgage%20
Finance2.pdf (accessed 10.08.2018), esp. 20-21. 
45 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Report on Systemic Risks the EU in Insurance Sector, December 2015, 
available electronically at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2015-12-16-
esrb_report_systemic_risks_EU_insurance_sector.en.pdf (accessed 01.09. 2017), Annex 4: Systemic Risks of 
Reinsurers. 
46 Artemis, ‘Buffalo Re cat bond launched at $125m for ICAT syndicate at Lloyd’s’, 22nd February 2017, available 
are being sponsored by states and public entities, as they can represent a cheaper option than 
insuring through traditional means.47 In 200948 the World Bank launched a programme designed 
to make this form of risk transfer accessible to developing countries and emerging economies,49 
despite the technical complexity of the product and the expenses involved. This program, called 
MultiCat, consists of ‘a catastrophe bond issuance platform that allows governments to use a 
standard framework to buy insurance on affordable terms through the capital markets,’50  whereby 
the World Bank acts as arranger for the transaction, assisting with technical aspects, and 
providing off-the-shelf documentation. Another interesting, and more recent, initiative is Global 
Parametrics ‘a parametric risk transfer provider backed by a third-party capitalised risk fund… 
[which] aims to focus its products on areas that can help to reduce the protection gap and help to 
address under- insurance of poor, and vulnerable people in developing countries.’51  Recently, 
the World Bank has issued cat bonds to Mexico giving it financial protection of USD 360m (GBP 
275m) against losses from natural disasters.52 
 
There is a risk that such schemes, encouraging the insuring of catastrophe risks in emerging 
economies and developing countries, as well as an increasing prevalence of schemes to make 
catastrophe risk insurance more widely accessible also in developed nations (see for example cat 
bonds issued by US public entities such as the California Earthquake Authority and the New 
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority53), coupled with the high demand for cat bonds 
among investors,54 may lead to a higher likelihood that the insurance industry will eventually 
adopt an “originate-to-distribute” approach to insuring these risks.55 It is also worth noting that 
recent reports suggest that non-insurers have started to sponsor cat bonds.56 This emphasises the 
                                                
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/02/22/buffalo-re-cat-bond-launched-at-125m-for-icat-
syndicate-at-lloyds/ (accessed 01.09.2017). 
47 See OECD (n 18), 139-141. See also The World Bank Treasury, Product Note: MultiCat Program, 9 July 2013, 
available electronically at http://treasury.worldbank.org/web/documents/MultiCat_ProductNote.July2013docx.pdf, 
(accessed 10. 09.2017), 1. For information on how such a cat bond would be structured see Mexico case study: The 
World Bank Treasury, Case Study: Insuring against Natural Disaster Risk in Mexico, undated, available 
electronically at http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/Case_Study/Mexico_MultiCatBond_2015.pdf (accessed 
10.09.2017), 2. 
48 See World Bank, ‘World Bank launches “MULTICAT PROGRAM”’, Press Releases, 16th October 2009, 
available electronically at http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/MULTICAT-PROGRAM.html (accessed 
10.09.2017). 
49 See World Bank, Protecting Development Resources, available electronically at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/htm/risk_financing.html (accessed 20.07.2016). 
50 World Bank, MultiCat Programme, Product Note, Updated 26th April 2011, available electronically at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/MultiCat_ProductNote.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017), 1. 
51 Artemis, ‘Global Parametrics to Bring Third-party Capital to Disaster Risk Transfer’, 13th June 2016, available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2016/06/13/global-parametrics-to-bring-third- party-capital-to-
disaster-risk-transfer/ (accessed 20.07.2016). 
52 S Christie, ‘The world’s largest ever “catastrophe bond” issued to Mexico, Telegraph, 8th August 2017, available 
electronically at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/08/08/worlds-largest-ever-catastrophe-bond-issued-mexico/ 
(accessed 14.09.2017). 
53 H Black, ‘Could Catastrophe Bonds Boost your Nest Egg? The High Risk Funds that Offer up to 8% Income a 
Year, but can Pay Much Less’, This is Money, 6th June 2017, available electronically at 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/investing/article-4578146/Could-TORNADO-bonds-boost-nest- egg.html 
(accessed 14.09.2017). See also Aon Benfield Q2 2017 Report (n 42), according to which six different public entities 
came to market during the Q2 period, with a total of USD 2.2 billion of catastrophe bond issuances. 
54 See Dizard (n 38). 
55 But see OECD (n 18), 107 and 108-[14]: ‘while in the context of [mortgage-backed securities (MBS)], the 
originator of a mortgage loan can completely remove itself from the risk equation, an insurance/reinsurance 
company issuing ILS remains directly liable vis-à-vis the policyholder/primary insurer. This … may avoid distorted 
incentives of the type that contributed to the sub-prime lending crisis in the United States.’ See also ibid, 115. It is 
uncertain what impact government policies in this field will have on this. 
56 See HSBC Global Research ‘Operational Risk Catastrophe Bonds: The New Kid on the Block’, Flashnote, 22nd 
April 2016 available electronically at https://www.research.hsbc.com/R/10/sKgRB7vDSPKT (accessed 
interconnectivity that may be created by the issue and distribution of these products. 
 
In 2015, the European Systemic Risk Board noted that: 
 
‘insurance-linked securities, for instance catastrophe bonds, transfer insurance risks 
to investors. This broadens the scope for risk transferral, but it also creates 
additional links between (re)insurers and financial markets. This might make the 
reinsurance market more vulnerable to investors’ procyclical behaviour. For 
instance, the ongoing search for yield in the current environment attracts investors 
in catastrophe bonds, which in turn drives down the price of risks insured (even 
though the risks themselves may not have changed materially)’.57 
 
Similarly, EIOPA observed in its 2014 Financial Stability Report that: 
 
‘The increased issuance of e.g. catastrophe bonds also creates links between 
reinsurers and financial markets. It may also result in some degree of opaqueness 
where it is not entirely clear who holds the risk. This makes the reinsurance market 
vulnerable to investors’ procyclical behaviour as well.’58 
 
Furthermore, investors in cat bonds include catastrophe funds, mutual funds, reinsurers hedge 
funds and institutional investors, including insurers, thus increasing the linkages with the 
insurance sector.59 Thus, catastrophe bonds create unique interconnectedness between on the one 
hand insurers, reinsurers, public entities or countries and on the other, capital markets. 
 
It is worth noting that, at the time of writing, it appears that cat bonds are treated favourably for 
Solvency II60 purposes,61 which might encourage investment in these instruments by insurers, 
leading to a situation where relevant risks may be transferred off insurers’ balance sheets only 
to find their way back onto them in a different form. It is reported that ‘[m]any institutional 
investors are already successfully including ILS in their portfolios, either through outsourcing to 
dedicated funds or investing directly.’62 While it is not clear what proportion of institutional 
investors’ portfolios is constituted of cat bonds and other ILS, in view of the fact that insurers 
are among the largest institutional investors, this trend may mean that in spite of transferring 
(and therefore divesting themselves of) catastrophe risk,63 insurers may become re-exposed to 
that same risk by the indirect route of investing in cat bonds. Additionally, it is worth noting that 
in January 2016 the IAIS reported that in their search for yield, insurers are diversifying their 
investments, and are investing in alternative instruments including private equity and hedge 
                                                
10.09.2017). 
57 ESRB (n 45), 19-20. 
58 EIOPA FSR 2014 (n 32), 29. 
59 Aon Benfield 2016 Report, Insurance-Linked Securities Alternative Markets Find Growth Through Innovation 
available electronically at http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/pages/Home.aspx?ReportCategory=Insurance-
Linked%20Securities (accessed 10.08.2018). 
60 Council Directive 2009/138/EC of 25 November 2009 on the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance 
and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) OJ L 335/1 (hereinafter, Solvency II Directive). 
61 See Artemis, ‘Cat bonds an attractive investment for EU insurers in a Solvency II world,’ 3rd March 2017 available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/03/03/cat-bonds-an-attractive-asset- for-eu-insurers-in-a-
solvency-ii-world/ (accessed 10.09.2017). 
62 Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 1. 
63 See 2013 study by Weiss et. al. which found that insurers decrease their contribution to systemic risk through 
issuing cat bonds: G N F Weiss, D Bostandzic, F Iressberger, ‘Catastrophe Bonds and Systemic Risk’ Discussion 
Paper 30/2013, Technische Universtät Dortmund, Fakultät Statistik, available electronically at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313160 (accessed 10.08.2018), 4. 
funds,64 which in turn may have ILS and cat bonds as part of their portfolios. This situation is 
reminiscent of reinsurer retrocession to other reinsurers, which may lead to severe 
interconnectedness among reinsurers, and which led to the high-profile Lloyd’s of London 
failure in the 1980s.65 
 
Finally, financial market risk and insurance underwriting risks are not always uncorrelated. 
Various types of events could conceivably trigger instability simultaneously in financial markets 
and insurance markets.66 For instance, a global pandemic could not only have a devastating 
impact on catastrophe risk but could also trigger panic in capital markets. 
 
 
B.2.3 Substitutability 
 
Catastrophe reinsurance can be regarded as a substitute for catastrophe bonds and vice versa.67 
The increase of significant loss events since the 1990s and the growing demand for natural 
catastrophe insurance prompted insurers to explore alternative ways to alleviate those risks. The 
increase in the potential losses that may be caused by natural catastrophes as a result of the effects 
of climate change and global warming,68 however, may mean that it may not be possible for the 
traditional reinsurance market to absorb catastrophe risks and that recourse to the capital markets 
is the only way in which these risks may be appropriately insured against. Therefore the extent 
to which the cat bond market is substitutable is uncertain. 
 
 
B.2.4 Complexity and Opaqueness 
 
Cat bond issues are gradually moving from being highly customised and tailor-made transactions 
to becoming more commoditised, especially parametric cat bonds,69 with contract terms 
becoming more standardised.70 Whilst standardization decreases opacity, it also makes cat bonds 
more accessible, and coupled with their attractive features, will facilitate a situation where the 
volume and distribution of these instruments in the capital markets continues to increase. In these 
circumstances, it becomes essential to monitor for poor structuring which, in view of the fact 
that these instruments are inherently high risk, can lead to systemic consequences if a catastrophe 
leads to widespread negative returns for investors.71 It is also worth mentioning that as 
                                                
64 GIMAR 2016 (n 33), 22. 
65 See European Systemic Risk Board, Report on Systemic risks in the EU Insurance Sector, December 2015, Annex 
4, Systemic Risks of Reinsurers, available electronically at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2015-12-16-
esrb_report_systemic_risks_EU_insurance_sector.en.pdf (accessed 20.08.2017), [27]-[30], esp. [29]. 
66 D Schwarcz and S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance’ (2014) 81 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1569, 1607. 
67 M Nell and A Richter ‘Catastrophe Index-Linked Securities and Reinsurance as Substitutes’ Working Paper 
Series: Finance and Accounting, No. 56, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Department of Finance, August 
2000, available electronically at https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/76942 (accessed 14.09.2017). 
68 See Aon Benfield, 2016 Global Climate and Catastrophe Report, January 2017, available electronically at 
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20170117-ab-if-annual-climate-catastrophe-report.pdf 
(accessed 20.08.2017). 
69 See OECD (n 18), 117: ‘The proliferation of index-based securitized instruments likely contributed to increased 
liquidity and trading of securitized instruments prior to the crisis…. Research has shown that the issuance and 
trading of index-based products grew rapidly due to the increased acceptance of indexes…. These indexes are 
subject to transparent rules and helped to standardize CDS structures.’ 
70 For a discussion of the impact of standardization in securitization see OECD (n 18), 118. 
71 See Risk Management Solutions (n 14), 8: ‘Although cat bonds are inherently risky, making it possible for the 
notional amount to be quickly exhausted once the triggering event occurred, they have historically offered excellent 
returns. The market performed well even in years with multiple cat event occurrences—there has not been a single 
standardisation of cat bonds increases, a secondary (derivative) market may also become more 
established. This involves instruments such as catastrophe collateralised risk obligations (CROs) 
and cat-linked derivatives, including futures, swaps and options.72 
 
The occurrence of these developments is highly reliant on modelling of risks and standardisation 
of cat-bond products and their derivatives. Good modelling in turn depends on making the right 
assumptions73 and using high quality information, which may be scarce, particularly for regions 
where property insurance against catastrophe risks is relatively new. This may well have 
implications in terms of risk-pricing. As noted by Jarzabkowski et al.: 
 
‘… models do not predict or value the risk, but rather provide the basis for 
coordination of pricing efforts alongside other knowledgeable practices within the 
market. Specifically, … marketization is enacted within the practical 
understandings of “technicalizing” deals through calculative devices such as 
models. However … the inadequacy of the models is tempered by importing deep 
professional knowledge into the calculation of unpredictable risk. Such 
“contextualizing” includes evoking knowledge of the physical properties of the risk, 
knowledge of the client, and knowledge of the market cycle…. [But] bundling risk 
is weighting the appraisal of deals further towards technicalizing and a dependence 
on models.’74 
 
Another danger that may emerge from the commoditisation process could derive from a changing 
perception of catastrophe risks from being unpredictable and volatile to risks that can be analysed 
and measured accurately through sophisticated calculative devices.75 Indeed, the type of risk cat 
bonds are designed to transfer of its nature carries a large element of uncertainty and 
unpredictability.76 This means that the past is not a reliable indicator of the future, and therefore 
that it is no mean feat to model for this risk.77 Below are two graphs that show respectively 
worldwide natural catastrophes (Figure 3) and worldwide natural catastrophe losses (Figure 4) 
from 1980 to 2016. They show that while the number of catastrophes has been increasing more 
or less steadily, the size of losses incurred has varied considerably. Losses of course depend 
on the extent to which property in areas affected by natural disasters has been insured. Thus, a 
natural catastrophe occurring in the United States where the insuring of property is widespread 
is likely to give rise to far greater losses overall than one occurring in the developing world, 
where it is a relatively rare practice to take out such insurance. Should the practice of taking out 
property insurance become more widespread in emerging economies and developing countries, 
however, this would change. 
 
  
                                                
12-month period to date where cat bonds incurred a negative return. Interestingly, historical experience suggests 
that one key to success in this asset class is the avoidance of a small number of poorly structured bonds.’ 
72 See OECD (n 18), 125-126 and 149-150. 
73 See S Perrakis and A Boloorforoosh, ‘Catastrophe futures and reinsurance contracts: An incomplete markets 
approach’, (2018) 38 Journal of Futures Markets 104, 122, arguing that the long-held Merton assumption that ‘the 
rare event risk is fully diversifiable’ and that ‘a unique risk-adjusted distribution of the CAT event can be extracted 
from other traded financial instruments indexed on the event distribution’ is rejected by recent empirical evidence. 
74 P Jarzabkowski, R Bednarek and P Spee, Making a Market for Acts of God: The practice of risk- trading in the 
global reinsurance industry (OUP, 2015), 174-5. 
75 Jarzabkowski et al. (n 74), 176. 
76 OECD (n 18), 111. 
77 Dizard (n 38): ‘The problem for the buyers, if not for US east coast residents, is that there have been far fewer 
severe weather events than commonly accepted actuarial models predicted in the years since the 2008 global 
financial crisis.’ 
Figure 3 
Number of worldwide natural catastrophes occurring from 1980 to 201678 
 
 
Source: © 2017 Munich Re, Geo Risks Research, NatCatSERVICE. As of March 2017. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Worldwide natural catastrophe losses occurring between 1980 and 201679 
 
 
Source: © 2017 Munich Re, Geo Risks Research, NatCatSERVICE. As of March 2017. 
 
Additionally, if cat-linked derivative products take catastrophe bond issues as their reference 
point, but the party purchasing protection were not actually exposed to the catastrophic event 
and were only using the derivative for speculation, financial exposure to the catastrophic event 
would be created where before there was none,80 and the impact of any underlying unsound 
modelling and risk-mispricing would multiply exponentially.  
 
Because of the hazards that can derive from the bundling of risks that securitisation makes 
possible, Jarzabkowski et al. liken emerging developments in this field to the processes 
(involving asset- and mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations) leading up 
                                                
78 World Natural Catastrophes, 1980–2016 (number of events), available electronically at 
https://www.munichre.com/topics-online/en/2017/topics-geo/overview-natural-catastrophe-2016 (accessed 
10.09.2017). 
79 World Natural Catastrophe Losses, 1980–2016 (overall and insured losses) https://www.munichre.com/topics-
online/en/2017/topics-geo/overview-natural-catastrophe-2016 (accessed 10.09.2017). 
80 Compare the use of credit-default swaps in the run-up to the financial crisis, discussed in Schwarcz and Schwarcz 
(n 66), 1585. 
to the 2008-2009 financial crisis.81 While this contention may be controversial,82 it is fair to say 
that regulators, particularly macroprudential regulators, who ignore these developments, might 
well be doing so at their peril, particularly in view of the consequences arising as a result of over-
reliance on risk models in the recent financial crisis.83 
 
Lack of transparency may also be a key factor in increasing the complexity of cat bonds.84 Market 
intelligence suggests that the price transparency of ILS has been declining: ‘Fewer “pricing 
sheets” are being generated and some of the ones that are produced quote quite wide markets.’85 
 
These preliminary assessments indicate that supervisors should keep an eye on the development 
and use of cat bonds, as, while the market is not yet systemically relevant, there is certainly the 
potential for it to expand rapidly. History shows that state intervention can create or enhance the 
conditions leading to rapid expansion of markets by encouraging certain activities. A prime 
example is the effect on the US mortgage market of Federal policies of the 1990s.86 Interestingly, 
in the UK the trend seems to be towards encouraging an increased use of ILS, and this trend 
appears to espouse a “light regulation” policy. The stated aim of the UK Government, through 
the implementation of the Risk Transformation Regulations 2017 (RTR) and the Risk 
Transformation (Tax) Regulations 2017 (RTR Tax), is to make London a centre for insurance-
linked securitizations.87 This securitization activity and the resultant financial products  are 
subject to regulation and supervision by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the UK’s 
Conduct of Business financial supervisor and by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), the 
UK’s prudential financial supervisor. 88 The regulatory framework is based on the possibility of 
                                                
81 Jarzabkowski et al. (n 74), 179: ‘MacKenzie’s work uncovered that the calculative practices used to evaluate 
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Times, 3rd May 2015. 
83 E F Gerding, ‘Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the 
Global Financial Crisis’, (2009) 84 Washington Law Review, 127-198. 
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86 Fligstein and Goldstein (n 44), 19-22. A Keller, ‘The Possible Distributional Effects of the Loan-to-Value Ratio 
and its Use as a Macro-prudential Tool by the European Systemic Risk Board’ (2013) 28(7) JIBLR 266, 267. 
87 Insurance Risk Transformation is defined in Reg 13A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/544). Recently, first cat bonds have been issued under the new RTR regime: 
Artemis (June 2018) available electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/06/04/gc-securities-cites-strong-
investor-support-for-first-uk-cat-bond-from-scor/ (accessed 10.06.2018)  See also Foreword of the HM Treasury, 
Regulations Implementing a New Regulatory and Tax Framework for Insurance- Linked Securities: Consultation, 
November 2016. 
88 R 7 RTR; PRA Policy Statement 26/17 ‘Authorisation and supervision of insurance special purpose vehicles’ 
November 2017 available electronically at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-
regulation/policy-statement/2017/ps2617.pdf (accessed 9.06.2018). The Scope of Permission (SOP) defines the 
boundaries within which the ISPV may carry on the regulated activity of insurance risk transformation. PRA 
Supervisory Statement SS8/17, ‘Authorisation and supervision of insurance special purpose vehicles’ December 
2017 available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/supervisory-
statement/2017/ss817update.pdf (accessed 10.06.18), paras 2.13-2.18. Whilst the PRA leads the authorisation, the 
using insurance special purpose vehicles (ISPVs) set up as protected cell companies (PCCs) to 
facilitate ILS issuances. The protected cell structure is designed to permit multiple issuances of 
cat bonds to be made by the same ISPV (making it a multi-arrangement ISPV (mISPV)), while 
keeping such issuances adequately protected in terms of default risk through effective 
segregation of deals within the mISPV. 
 
When the proposals for legislation permitting these structures were first floated the PRA 
expected to have the power to pre-approve the assumption of a new risk and the issue of new 
ILS (effected by the creation of new segregated cells within the PCC).  However in the final 
version of the regulations, while the PRA will be able to specify the kinds of risk transfer deals 
into which the mISPV is permitted to enter at the time of granting it authorisation to provide 
financial services, the PRA will not have the power to pre-approve the assumption of new risk 
by an already authorised mISPV. Rather the mISPV must notify the PRA within a period of 5 
working days from the risk being assumed.89 Care should be taken to ensure that these 
notifications are such as to provide the information required to assess the cumulative impact in 
systemic terms of cat bond issuances and to gauge whether macroprudential intervention is 
necessary.90 
 
It is also worth noting that the EU Securitisation Regulation91 does not apply to catastrophe risk 
securitisations as it contemplates only securitised credit risk and not any other type of risk.92 This 
being the case, it should be considered whether a risk-retention requirement as well as 
requirements on simplicity, standardization and transparency should be otherwise imposed on 
catastrophe risk securitisations effected in the UK. 
 
It is suggested here that a box-ticking approach via a strict application of the criteria for assessing 
systemic importance should be avoided. Decisions made by regulators and supervisors should 
be based on qualitative assessment that feeds from market intelligence as complement to numeric 
application of the test. This suggestion is in line with a recent report which reviewed the culture 
of the FCA, PRA and the Bank of England.93 The Report identified a ‘deep seated culture of 
box-ticking’ and suggested that ‘unless we change the culture of regulators we will be sleep 
walking into the next financial crisis.’94 
 
 
                                                
FCA’s consent is required before granting approval. In giving its consent, the FCA is required to ensure, according 
to s 55B FSMA, that the applicant satisfies and continues to satisfy the Threshold Conditions (COND 2.3-2.7 FCA 
Handbook). FCA Statement ‘Authorising and supervising insurance special purpose vehicles’ December 2017, 
available electronically at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/statement-authorising-and-supervising-
insurance-special-purpose-vehicles.pdf (accessed 9.06.2018). By doing so, the PRA would be circumscribing the 
mISPV’s Part 4A Permission of FSMA (i.e. authorisation to provide financial services). 
89 R 60(1)-(2) RTR. According to R 60(3) RTR Rules made under s 137G FSMA may specify the form of 
notification, information to be provided and the form in which it is to be provided. 
90 It is essential to monitor carefully the relationship, not just legal but also economic, between the ISPV or mISPV 
and its sponsor or the risk-transferring entity. See discussion in WW Bratton and JM Levitin, ‘A transactional 
Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken, to Enron, to Goldman Sachs’ (2013) 8 Southern California Law 
Review 783, giving several examples of how Special Purpose Entities were able to escape regulation by funneling 
inter-firm connections through contracts, rather than equity ownership. 
91 Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of 12 December 2017 laying down common rules on securitisation and creating a 
European framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation OJ L 347/35 (hereinafter “Securitisation 
Regulation”). The date of application is 1 January 2019. 
92 See Securitisation Regulation (n 91), Article 2 (1). 
93  New City Agenda, Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England: Practising what they Preach?, 
29th August 2016 available electronically at http://newcityagenda.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/NCA-
Cultural-change-in-regulators-report_embargoed.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017). 
94  New City Agenda (n 93), 6. 
C Product Intervention Powers 
 
In view of the potential for cat bonds to generate systemic risk depending on trends and practices 
surrounding their structure, their sale and their distribution in the financial markets, it is very 
important that supervisors should have the possibility to intervene speedily and decisively should 
this potential start to materialise. Under this heading we shall be discussing the merits of using 
product intervention powers such to this end when compared with other options for regulatory 
intervention. Subsequently, under Heading D of this paper we shall assess the extent to which 
product intervention powers available to UK supervisors can be harnessed for this purpose. 
 
 
C.1 What are Product Intervention Powers? 
 
Product intervention imposes restrictions on the offering, distributing, terms or features, and/or 
marketing of financial products. Product Intervention began to be considered seriously as a 
regulatory option in the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial crisis,95 which eventually led to 
various product intervention powers being introduced in recent years at UK and EU level. In 
the EU these powers were introduced as a “second generation” or “legacy” effect of the reform 
to the EU financial regulatory architecture following the crisis, and are an example of 
regulatory innovation.96 They are a symptom of a changed approach to financial innovation, 
which, post-crisis, tends to be viewed with more suspicion.97 In 2011, the then Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) defined Product Intervention as ‘[r]egulatory interventions focused 
on products, including greater supervisory focus earlier in the value chain and of ongoing 
product governance, rules targeting product features, rules limiting sales of products and setting 
down specific conditions of sale.’98  
 
Product Intervention is still in its infancy and conceptually its boundaries and objectives remain 
hazy. As shall be seen under Heading D, in its Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA) manifestation, product intervention is tied to conduct of business objectives, assigned 
to the FCA, currently including consumer protection,99 and competition, and is not connected 
with financial stability and the need to monitor and minimize systemic risk. 
 
For instance, in August 2014 the FCA issued temporary product intervention rules introducing 
restrictions on the distribution of contingent convertible instruments (CoCos) to retail 
                                                
95 See N Moloney, ‘The legacy effects of the financial crisis on regulatory design in the EU’, Chapter 2 in E Ferran, 
The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP, 2012), 111-202.  
96 Moloney (n 95), 112; 115-117. 
97 Moloney (n 95), 136-137 and 186-201. 
98 Financial Services Authority (FSA), Product Intervention, Discussion Paper DP11/1, January 2011, 6. 
99 Consumer protection also appears to be the primary goal of product intervention in the United States. Indeed 
product intervention powers under Dodd-Frank were conferred upon the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1031 
(a)-(b) (2010). See also discussion in V Di Lorenzo, ‘Barriers to Market Discipline: a Comparative Study of 
Regulatory Reforms (2012) 29 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 517. However it should be noted that one of the two financial 
stability regulators in the US – the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) – intersects with product 
intervention regulation in a number of ways: In the consumer lending context, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) is the market conduct regulator and has ample product intervention powers.  The Director of the 
Bureau is a voting member of FSOC and the Bureau in the course of the Director’s FSOC duties has undertaken 
analyses of consumer financial products for systemic risk. FSOC can also overrule any product intervention rules 
by the Bureau that jeopardize financial stability. For a discussion of the availability and use of countercyclical tools 
in the US regulatory landscape see P A McCoy, ‘Countercyclical Regulation and its Challenges’ (2016) 47 Arizona 
State Law Journal 1181, esp. 1195-1196 and 1208-1218, in particular the “ability to repay” rule introduced by Dodd-
Frank which is implemented by the CFPB. 
investors.100 In relation to retail investors, the product intervention rules generally did not permit 
firms to sell, promote or intermediate transactions in CoCos that would result in ordinary retail 
investors investing in CoCos. On the other hand, under EU law, the power may be exercised in 
furtherance of the financial stability objective.  
 
It seems that product intervention was initially conceived as a way of protecting consumer 
investors from the risks associated with both poor design of and poor distribution practices (e.g. 
mis-selling) relating to financial products (particularly innovative ones). Even though disclosure 
and anti-fraud rules should in theory provide the discipline required for the market to 
differentiate between well-designed and distributed products and ones which carry these risks, a 
number of factors, including lack of familiarity with new products, the volume and complexity 
of information disclosed, cognitive and behavioural biases and misaligned incentives,101 may 
mean that the market is not equipped to identify and address these failings. In theory product 
intervention might do much to address them, but it should be borne in mind that as a new and 
untested regulatory tool, its use may have ‘unexpected effects’102 and that, while maintaining an 
open mind as to its potential, it has been argued that it is prudent to remain realistic about what 
product intervention can do,103 particularly when one bears in mind that the regulator needs to 
tread a fine line between supporting innovation and investor choice and intervening where such 
innovation poses wider risks that it is within the regulator’s mandate to address.104 Not only 
would regulators need to assess when there is a potential for the cat-bond market to become 
systemic, requiring preventive action, but they would also need to assess what type of product 
intervention is needed to prevent or mitigate this risk appropriately.  In addition, regulators will 
need to conduct a balancing exercise between two opposing aims. On the one hand, the need to 
control the build-up of systemic risk and on the other hand, the need to ensure that intervention 
does not depresses the market more than is warranted and ultimately does not inhibit economic 
growth.105 Regulators’ inaction bias may well mean that the latter concerns may be given more 
weight than the former, inhibiting the use of product intervention as a macroprudential tool, 
however we argue that it is incumbent on regulators to overcome such inaction bias, 106  and that 
they should not hesitate to intervene in a robust manner when such intervention can be justified 
on data-driven analysis of the relevant product market and similar past regulatory interventions 
(either in the UK or elsewhere). 
 
 
C.2 Why product intervention to regulate cat bonds? 
 
As explained under Heading B.2, it is possible that a number and variety of factors and 
circumstances may conspire to increase exponentially the volume of cat bond issues and their 
                                                
100 FCA, Restrictions in relation to the Retail Distribution of Contingent Convertible Instruments, August 2014, 
available electronically at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/tpi/restrictions-in-relation-to-the-retail-distribution-
of-cocos.pdf (accessed 01.09.2017). 
101 See D Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (2012) 2 Harvard 
Business Law Review, 235-294, esp. 262-267. 
102 Moloney (n 95), 196. 
103 Moloney (n 95), 197 argues that ‘if the new regime enmeshes the regulator in complex, detailed and resource-
intensive oversight of industry product-development processes, with the attendant moral hazard and resource risk 
to the regulator’ this could affect adversely supervisory effectiveness. 
104 See Moloney (n 95), 198. 
105 Both the Financial Policy Committee and the European Systemic Risk Board have these opposing objectives in 
their mandates. On the complexities and the challenges these bring, see A Keller, ‘The Mandate of the European 
Systemic Risk Board and Resilience as an Essential Component: Part 1’ 
(2015) 31(1) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 13. 
106 See discussion in Keller (n 105).  
prevalence in the financial markets over the coming years. If low interest rates persist, their 
comparatively high yields are likely to continue to be perceived as attractive. If demand for these 
instruments should continue to rise, an originate-to-distribute approach might start to prevail 
among issuers that could lead to a less careful pricing of risk.107 Widespread common exposures 
to a single catastrophe can multiply many times the impact such an event would have on the 
financial markets, causing widespread financial panic and instability. For this reason, we argued 
in 2015 that constant and careful monitoring of ILS activities in general, and cat bond activities 
in particular, was essential to the performance of the macroprudential supervisor’s role.108 In line 
with this, the potential systemic significance of ILS has not escaped the notice of the Financial 
Policy Committee (FPC).109 
 
The next question then relates to the means/ tools for taking action to address and mitigate 
failures that come to light as a result of the macroprudential monitoring. If the design or 
distribution practices relating to a particular financial innovation causes concern to the 
macroprudential supervisor, such supervisor needs to have the means to address them. If the 
systemic concerns are prompted not by the solvency or liquidity of any individual financial 
institution but by a market-wide trend or practice in relation to the design or distribution of 
financial products, it is submitted that the most efficient way of addressing such concerns would 
be to take action in relation to such trends or practices, rather than to attempt to address the 
potential impact on individual institutions through microprudential supervisory action targeting 
those institutions.110 Product intervention powers are particularly well suited to intervening to 
address such systemic risks. As shall be seen under Heading D below, supervisors can make 
rules targeting specific problematic features of the product’s design or problematic practices 
surrounding its distribution. These interventions can create rules that apply indefinitely or can 
be designed as temporary measures, as the circumstances require. Thus, with one well-
considered and appropriately targeted brush stroke the supervisor can correct trends and practices 
that, if allowed to carry on unchecked, could result in a build-up of systemic risk. Targeting 
design and distribution with precision, as would be possible if appropriate product intervention 
powers were wielded at a macro level, might make better sense for the achievement of financial 
stability than, for example, attempting to address high demand by simply changing a product’s 
status as an admitted asset for solvency purposes, which could lead to fire sales. The type of 
product intervention would vary in accordance with the source of risk. For instance, if the risk 
emanated from the opacity of the product, macroprudential supervisors could intervene in the 
design of cat bonds and require certain information to be included; if the risk originated in 
modelling of the product the supervisor could introduce product intervention rules in relation to 
the standards of pricing and/ or impose entry requirements for entities that conduct the 
                                                
107 There are indications that even now supply is failing to meet demand. See Clear Path Analysis, Insurance Linked 
Securities for Institutional Investors 2017: An Evolving Asset Class Poised for Growth, May 2017 available 
electronically from  https://www.clearpathanalysis.com/reports/insurance-linked-securities-institutional-investors-
2017 (accessed 17.08.2017), 14. See also Artemis,  
‘More risk required to enable greater allocations to ILS, finds report’, Artemis, 23rd May 2017 available 
electronically at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/05/23/more-risk-required-to-enable-greater-allocations-to-ils-
finds-report/ (accessed 10.09.2017). 
108 Goldby and Keller (n 25), 71-72. 
109 See A French, M Vital and D Minot, ‘Insurance and Financial Stability’, [2015] Q3 Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, 242, 252.  
110 In this vein, see also S T Omarova, ‘License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products’ 
(2012-13) 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 63, 66: ‘if we cannot effectively regulate and control systemic risk associated with 
the increasing complexity in financial markets, we need to reduce and control the overall level of complexity in 
the system. Because much of that risk-generating complexity is a result of strategic efforts of financial 
intermediaries that structure, market, and deal in complex financial instruments, the most radical and direct 
method of reducing systemic risk is to insert regulatory controls at the point of product development, before the 
risk is introduced into the financial system.’ 
modelling; if the risk were connected to the distribution of the product the supervisor can require 
that cat bonds be sold only in specific market places or that they be purchased only by certain 
types of entities.   
 
Therefore, a strong link may be perceived between the attainment of macroprudential objectives 
and product intervention powers, a link which suggests that the macroprudential supervisor 
should have a strong involvement in the product intervention process, whether in order to direct 
the powers towards the achievement of financial stability goals, or whether to monitor the impact 
where such powers are exercised to achieve conduct-of-business goals. Where the exercise of 
product intervention powers rests on a conduct-of-business supervisor therefore, the interaction 
between such supervisor and the agency charged with macroprudential oversight is crucial. It is 
submitted also that the conferment of product intervention powers exclusively on a conduct-of-
business regulator to be exercised solely for the attainment of consumer protection objectives 
can be problematic: in view of the potential for systemic risk to build up gradually over time, a 
product may be systemically relevant without necessarily being detrimental to individual 
investors. If in spite of being conferred to attain consumer-protection goals, the power is 
exercised in furtherance of financial stability objectives, such exercise may be challenged as 
ultra vires. In light of this, it is submitted that product intervention can and should be legislatively 
designed as a tool not merely to achieve consumer protection objectives but also to further 
macroprudential goals.  
 
In the next part, we will be analysing how UK and EU law respectively have approached the 
design of product intervention powers. This analysis is intended to evaluate the principles and 
regulatory objectives that informed the legal framework establishing the powers, to assess the 
extent to and the ease with which these powers may be used for macroprudential purposes under 
current law and to gauge whether their use for such purposes may give rise to conflicts. 
 
 
D. Product Intervention Powers that may be exercised in the UK  
 
In this section, we shall analyse product intervention powers that may be exercised in the UK. 
We shall start by examining powers deriving from UK law. In section D.1.1 we will discuss the 
product intervention powers of the PRA and the FCA as assigned in the FSMA (as amended by 
the Financial Services Act 2012) and whether these powers could be utilised for macroprudential 
purposes. In section D.1.2 we will outline the powers assigned in the Bank of England Act 1998 
to the FPC and whether these could assist in triggering, where necessary, product intervention 
for macroprudential purposes in the UK. We conclude that the use of product intervention 
powers in pursuit of financial stability under UK law is not straightforward and requires action 
by the Treasury (possibly on the advice of the FPC) as well as a consultation process before it 
may be exercised. 
 
Section D.2 then deals with product intervention powers deriving from EU law. These sources 
are varied and range from the founding Regulations of the European Supervisory Authorities 
(‘the ESAs Regulations’) 111 to product-specific pieces of legislation. We shall examine each one 
                                                
111 Council Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of 14 November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission decision 
2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331/12 (the ‘EBA Regulation’); Council Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of 24 November 
2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission decision 2009/79/EC [2010] OJ L 331/48 (the 
‘EIOPA Regulation’); Council Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 Establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
of these legal sources and the respective intervention powers they assign to the ESAs or to the 
national competent authorities (NCAs) of the member states, focusing in particular on NCAs in 
the UK. In the process, we shall also consider the extent to which these powers may be used to 
address systemic risk arising from ILSs such as cat-bonds. We shall see that the legal framework 
for product intervention in the EU is complex, patchy and at times even contradictory. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that EU law may provide NCAs in the UK with tools for product 
intervention where financial stability concerns arise which go beyond those provided by 
domestic law, and which may be relevant to addressing any systemic risk originating in the cat 
bonds market. The exercise of these powers will depend on the fulfilment of various conditions 
and requirements, as detailed in this section.  
 
 
D.1 Product intervention powers conferred by UK law 
 
D.1.1 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
 
Section 137D of FSMA empowers the FCA with rule-making powers of product intervention. 
Section 137D(2) provides that the product intervention rules made by the FCA may prohibit 
authorised persons from (a) entering into specified agreements with any person or specified 
person; (b) entering into specified agreements with any person or specified person unless 
requirements specified in the rules have been satisfied; (c) doing anything that would or might 
result in the entering into of specified agreements by persons or specified persons, or the 
holding by them of a beneficial or other kind of economic interest in specified agreements; (d) 
doing anything within paragraph (c) unless requirements specified in the rules have been 
satisfied.112 
 
‘Specified agreements’ are those meeting the description specified in general rules made by the 
FCA.113 Rules made by the FCA may range from  
 
‘requiring certain product features to be included, excluded, or changed, requiring 
amendments to promotional materials, to imposing restrictions on sales or marketing of 
the product or, in more serious cases, a ban on sales or marketing of a product in relation 
to all or some types of customer.’114  
 
If contravened, the rules may provide for a relevant agreement or obligation to be 
unenforceable, for money or other property to be recovered or for compensation to be paid.115 
 
The product intervention powers can be exercised when it is necessary or expedient for the 
purpose of advancing the FCA’s consumer protection objective or its competition objective.116 
                                                
repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L331/84 (the ‘ESMA Regulation’). 
The EBA Regulation, the EIOPA Regulation and the ESMA Regulation are together referred to as the ‘ESAs 
Regulations’ 
112 According to section 137D(6) of FSMA the requirements that may be specified under subsection (2)(b) or (d) 
include in particular, requirements as to the terms and conditions that are to be, or are not to be, included in 
specified or other agreements, and requirements limiting invitations or inducements to enter into specified or other 
agreements to those made to specified persons. 
113 Section 137D(3) of the FSMA. General rules of the FCA are made in accordance with s 137A of FSMA. 
‘Specified persons’ are those meeting the description specified in rules by the FCA. 
114 FSA, ‘The FCA’s Use of Temporary Product Intervention Rules’ (March 2013) PS13/3 available electronically 
at https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/fsa-ps13-03.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017), 31. 
115 Section 137D(7) of FSMA.  
116 Section 137D(1)(a) of FSMA. 
These operational objectives advance the FCA’s strategic objective, i.e. to ensure that the 
relevant markets function well.117  The consumer protection objective is aimed at securing an 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers118 whilst the competition objective is aimed at 
promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers.119 
 
In addition, if the Treasury makes an order for these powers to apply, they may also be used to 
advance the integrity objective.120 This operational objective is defined as protecting and 
enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system. The “integrity” of the UK financial system 
includes, inter alia, its soundness, stability and resilience and the orderly operation of the 
financial markets121 and therefore, could potentially provide a basis for product intervention 
based on financial stability concerns. The FCA explains that in order to enhance market 
integrity it seeks, inter alia, to ensure that ‘firms’ business models, activities, controls and 
behaviour maintain trust in the integrity of markets and do not create or allow market abuse, 
systemic risk or financial crime.’122 The choice of the term “systemic risk” as a key indicator 
of market integrity clearly opens the door for product intervention to be used where 
macroprudential concerns arise.  
 
But what was the logic behind limiting the use of product intervention powers for the purpose 
of protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system? The government noted 
in its consultation that the FCA product intervention power is unlikely to be appropriate in 
relation to the protection of professional or wholesale customers. This position was strongly 
supported by respondents and ultimately led to the exclusion of the use of these powers to 
advance the integrity objective. Nevertheless, recognising that there may be circumstances in 
which it may be necessary to make product intervention rules for market integrity reasons, the 
FSMA provided the Treasury with an order-making power to extend the power to cover the 
FCA’s integrity objective.  
 
Interestingly, the Treasury Report ‘A New Approach to Financial Regulation: A Blueprint for 
Reform’ suggests that ‘[i]n line with its general powers, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
will be able to advise the Treasury on the exercise of this order-making power’.123 As will be 
discussed under heading D.1.2 below, the FPC’s primary objective is to identify, monitor and 
take action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the 
resilience of the UK financial system. Where such concerns necessitate the initiation of the 
Treasury order-making power, the FPC would be able to advise that product intervention 
powers be used for the purpose of preserving or enhancing market integrity. 
    
To date, the Treasury has not exercised this power and no intention to do so has been expressed. 
Moreover, given that these powers could have significant impact on firms, consumers and the 
market, safeguards have been put in place. The exercise of product intervention powers for the 
                                                
117 Section 1B(1) and 1B(2) of FSMA.  
118 Section 1C(1) FSMA. 
119 Section 1E(1) FSMA. 
120 Section 137D(1)(b) of FSMA. 
121 Section 1D of FSMA. 
122 FCA, Enhancing Market Integrity, first published 19th April 2016, last updated 9th January 2017, available 
electronically at https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enhancing-market-integrity (accessed 14.09.2017); FCA, The FCA’s 
Approach to Advancing Its Objectives 2015, December 2015, available electronically at  
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/fca-approach-advancing-objectives-2015.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017). 
123 HM Treasury, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: the Blueprint for Reform, June 2011, CM 8083 available 
electronically at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81403/consult_finreg__new_appro
ach_blueprint.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017), 30-31.  
purpose of preserving or enhancing market integrity is subject to a consultation process and 
cost-benefit analysis, unless delay would be ‘prejudicial to the interests of consumers’.124 Thus 
intervention in the absence of a consultation process is only permitted in pursuance of the 
consumer protection objective.  
 
In addition to the powers conferred by s 137D, s 138M of FSMA empowers the FCA to make 
Temporary Product Intervention Rules (TPIR) without consultation (and without complying 
with other requirements under FSMA, such as conducting a cost benefit analysis)125 where it 
considers that it is ‘necessary or expedient’ to do so to advance the consumer protection objective 
or the competition objective (or the integrity objective if the requisite order is made by the 
Treasury). TPIR are valid for a maximum of 12 months and cannot be re-made once they have 
expired.126 An FCA Policy Statement explains that:  
 
‘Rules may range from requiring certain product features to be included, excluded, or 
changed, requiring amendments to promotional materials, to imposing restrictions on 
sales or marketing of the product or, in more serious cases, a ban on sales or marketing 
of a product in relation to all or some types of customer.’127 
 
It is to be noted that in making any rule, including temporary or permanent product intervention 
rules, the FCA is under obligation to seek to promote effective competition in the interests of 
consumers where doing so is compatible with its consumer protection objective (or the integrity 
objective).128 Nevertheless, where promoting competition would be in conflict with the 
consumer protection or (if applicable) market integrity aims of a proposed product intervention 
rule, the consumer protection or market integrity aims will take precedence over competition 
considerations.129 
 
Thus, the primary objective of the intervention powers assigned in the FSMA appears to be the 
protection of investors and consumers of financial products. However, if the Treasury were to 
make an appropriate order these intervention powers may be used in furtherance of the FCA’s 
integrity objective and therefore, it is submitted, to address financial stability concerns, without 
the FCA thereby being found to have acted ultra vires. It should, however, be borne in mind, 
that financial stability is not the FCA’s primary concern nor is it likely to treat it as a priority. 
The Turner Review identified the FSA bias towards the consumer protection goal vis-à-vis its 
micro-prudential supervision as one of the failures of financial supervision in the UK in the years 
leading to the 2008-2009 financial crisis.130 This bias was the raison d’être for breaking up the 
FSA and the adoption of a twin peaks structure with the FCA and the PRA as its successors. The 
FCA was viewed as a ‘dedicated, specialist body with focused and clear statutory objectives and 
regulatory functions’ responsible for ‘regulation of conduct within the financial system-
including the conduct of firms towards their retail customers, and the conduct of participants in 
                                                
124 Sections 138I and 138L of FSMA. Interests of consumer as defined in section 425A of FSMA. 
125 Section 138M(1) of FSMA. 
126 Section 138M(3) and 138M(5) of FSMA. TRIP were used for the first time on the 5th of August 2014 to introduce 
restrictions on the ability of authorized persons to distribute contingent convertible instruments (CoCos) to retail 
investors.  
127 FCA, The FCAs’ Use of Temporary Product Intervention Rules, March 2013, PS 13/3 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/fsa-ps13-03.pdf accessed (14.09.2017). 
128 Section 1B(4) of FSMA.  
129 FCA PS 13/3 (n 127), 25. 
130 FSA, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, March 2009, available 
electronically at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017) (hereinafter Turner 
Review), 87. 
wholesale financial markets’.131  
 
Thus, it is submitted, the FCA is unlikely to act in furtherance of financial stability unless ordered 
to do so by authorities pursuing financial stability objectives (including macroprudential 
authorities).132 It is the PRA that has a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of 
firms it regulates.133 This objective is to be advanced primarily by seeking to ensure that the 
activity of these firms is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect on the stability of 
the UK financial system and by seeking to minimise the adverse effect that these firms’ failure 
could be expected to have on the stability of the UK financial system.134 The PRA, however, is 
not empowered with any product intervention powers by the FSMA, and, barring any exercise 
by the Treasury of its power to make an order prescribing a macroprudential measure conferring 
a discretion on the PRA,135 the latter’s ability to have an impact on product intervention where 
financial stability concerns arise is a negative one, i.e. it can require the FCA to refrain from 
exercising its intervention powers where it may threaten the stability of the UK financial system, 
or result in the failure of a firm the PRA regulates in a way that would adversely affect the UK 
financial system.136 
 
 
D.1.2 The Bank of England Act 1998 (BEA) as the source of the macroprudential powers of the 
FPC.  
 
The FPC is charged with a primary objective of identifying, monitoring and taking action to 
remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the 
UK financial system.137 In working with the FCA or the PRA or exercising functions in relation 
to either of them, the FPC is required, so far as it is possible to do so while complying with its 
objective, to seek to avoid exercising its functions in a way that would prejudice the 
advancement by the FCA of any of its operational objectives, or the advancement by the PRA 
of any of its objectives.138 The FPC has the power to give directions to the PRA or the FCA 
requiring macroprudential measures,139 which are measures prescribed by the Treasury by 
order, in accordance with s 9L of the Bank of England Act 1998 (BEA).  The direction, 
however, cannot require PRA or FCA to do anything that they do not have the power to do but 
rather to direct any discretion that was conferred on them. Hence, the FPC is able to give 
direction to the FCA to use its product intervention powers for the integrity objective, where 
the Treasury has given an order for that purpose. Where the Treasury fails to provide such an 
order the FPC can make a recommendation to the Treasury to that effect.140 As can be seen the 
use of product intervention powers in pursuit of financial stability under UK law is not 
straightforward and requires action by the Treasury (possibly on the advice of the FPC) as well 
                                                
131 HM Treasury, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability, July 2010, Cm7874, 
available electronically at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81389/consult_financial_regulation
_condoc.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017), [1.19]. At that stage of the legislative proposal, the FCA was named the 
Consumer Protection and Markets Authority. 
132 See discussion under D.1.2 and D.2 below.  
133 Section 2(B)(2) of FSMA. 
134 Section 2B(3) of FSMA.  
135 Section 9L of the Bank of England Act 1998 (BEA), discussed under heading D.1.2. 
136 Section 3I of FSMA.  
137 Section 9C(1) BEA. Its secondary objective is to support the economic policy of the Government (s 9C(2) of 
BEA). 
138 Section 9F(2) of BEA. 
139 Section 9H of BEA. 
140 Section 9P(2)(d) of BEA. 
as a consultation process before it may be exercised. This means that supervisors in the UK 
currently do not have the tools rapidly to intervene where sudden and acute systemic risk 
concerns arise. For instance, the regulator might want to intervene if a trigger catastrophic event 
were to take place and spur a sudden large scale fire sale141 of not just affected cat bonds, but 
also panic selling of cat bonds generally, which, as explained under heading B.2, may be 
detrimental to financial stability. In this situation, a useful macroprudential tool would be to 
impose a fire breaker for example by temporarily prohibiting the sale of affected cat bonds, 
pending clarity as to the actual losses consequent upon the trigger event. If regulators wanted 
to do this under current UK law, they would not be able to do so without first obtaining the 
required order from the Treasury, which is hardly conducive to prompt intervention to address 
an urgent market situation. 
 
 
D.2 Product Intervention Powers deriving from EU law  
 
D.2.1 The European Systemic Risk Board Regulation and the ESAs Regulations  
 
The FCA can also exercise the FSMA product intervention powers in furtherance of guidelines, 
recommendations or warnings emanating from one or more of the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs). The objective of the ESAs is to protect the public interest by contributing to 
the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the EU 
economy, its citizens and businesses.142 It is also part of their role to promote transparency, 
simplicity and fairness in the market for consumer financial products or services across the 
internal market.143 Therefore, the ESAs pursue both prudential and conduct-of-business 
objectives in their respective sector. 
 
To achieve these tasks the ESAs are given a wide range of powers. They have the power to 
adopt guidelines and recommendations addressed to NCAs or financial institutions with a view 
to promoting the safety and soundness of markets and convergence of regulatory practice.144 
According to Article 16 of the ESAs Regulations the aim of these guidelines and 
recommendations is to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices within 
the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), and to ensure the common, uniform and 
consistent application of EU law. Therefore, issuance of guidelines and recommendations for 
financial stability concerns will have to fall within the aim of promoting convergence within 
the EU.  
 
NCAs are required to comply with the ESAs’ guidelines and recommendations or in case of 
non-compliance explain the reasons behind their decision.145 The ESAs can also issue warnings 
about financial activities posing a serious threat to the objectives as laid down in article 1(5) of 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) Regulations or Article 1(6) of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) Regulation, that includes, as detailed above, the medium and long-term 
                                                
141 The recent price drop in cat bonds following hurricane Irma is an example for a sudden price drop which could 
potentially trigger a fire sale: Artemis, ‘Citrus Re 2017 Cat Bond Notes Trade Down 50% on Hurricane Irma threat’, 
6 September 2017 available at http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/09/06/citrus-re-2017-cat-bond-notes-trade-down-
50-on-hurricane-irma-threat/ (accessed 8 January 2018).  
142 Article 1(6) of EIOPA Regulation; Article 1(5) of the EBA Regulation and ESMA Regulation.  
143 Article 9(1) of the ESAs Regulations.  
144 Article 9(2) and Article 16 the ESAs Regulations.  
145 Article 16 of the ESAs Regulations. 
stability of the financial system.146 Nevertheless, the warnings issued to date by the ESAs were 
addressed to investors or consumers rather than NCAs, urging them to be aware of potential 
perils in specific investment activities and hence with the aim of consumer protection rather 
than in pursuit of financial stability.147 
 
As indicated under heading D.1, whilst the PRA does not have the statutory power for product 
intervention, the FCA may have, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, the authority to 
exercise these powers based on financial stability grounds. Where the FCA fails to do so and 
the relevant ESA identifies a serious threat to the stability of the financial system it may issue 
a warning addressed to the FPC (that, in turn, can give a direction to the FCA or advise the 
Treasury to use its order-making power) or directly to the FCA.  
 
Two important points should be considered. First, the FCA’s objectives refer to the financial 
system in the UK148 whilst the ESAs’ realm is the financial system in the EU. Given that the 
ESAs guidelines or recommendations are based on ‘comply or explain’ the FCA may be 
entitled to refuse to act in circumstances where, although beneficial at EU level, it is not 
beneficial to do so at UK level. Second, in contrast to the authorities in the UK, the ESAs differ 
according to the sector they supervise (rather than according to their functions). Therefore, 
determining, which is the relevant NCA in the UK for the purpose of the ESAs Regulations, 
may not always be straightforward. Which is the NCA will depend on the objective that the 
product intervention serves (broadly, financial stability or consumer protection) as well as the 
actual powers of the NCA. For instance, the EBA refers on its website to the PRA as well as 
the FCA as the NCA. If the EBA were to recommend the PRA to exercise product intervention 
powers to protect the stability of the market, the PRA would simply not be able to do so. It 
might be that the FPC would have to persuade the Treasury to make the necessary order to 
permit the necessary exercise of product intervention powers.  
 
The ESAs Regulations therefore provide a mechanism to encourage NCAs to act where risks 
to the financial system in the EU arise. The success of such mechanism depends on the 
existence of the necessary powers at the national level as well as the will to cooperate with the 
ESA given that the latter only has power to make “soft” law (guidelines and recommendations). 
It will be appreciated that process described above whereby this may be achieved is a rather 
unwieldy one and not amenable to speedy intervention. Nevertheless, the different levels of 
consultation required may have their advantages in view of the necessity of striking the right 
balance between permitting innovation in response to demand and taking preventive action in 
the face of systemic risk. 
 
In addition to instigating action by the Member States’ NCAs through guidelines, 
recommendations or warnings, the ESAs themselves have temporary product intervention 
powers. According to Article 9(5) of the ESAs Regulations they may temporarily prohibit or 
restrict certain financial activities149 that threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of 
                                                
146 Article 9(3) of the ESAs Regulations.  The ESMA, for instance, issued in December 2011 a warning about trading 
in foreign exchange however in that case the aim of the warning was consumer protection rather than financial 
stability concern. ESMA, Trading in Foreign Exchange, Investor Warning, 5th December 2011, available 
electronically at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2011-412_1.pdf (accessed 
14.09.2017). 
147 The ESAs have issued numerous warnings: on investments in Foreign Exchange (Forex) (December 2011), 
on the pitfalls of online investments (September 2012) on Contracts for Differences (CfD) (April 2013); on 
virtual currencies (December 2013) and on CFDs, binary options and other speculative products (July 2016). 
148 Article 1D of FSMA. 
149 The ESAs Regulations do not define ‘financial activities’ but paragraph 50 of the preamble of each refers to the 
power temporarily to prohibit activities or products.    
financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the EU where 
permitted in a specific EU legislative act listed in article 1(2) of the ESAs Regulations. The 
legislative acts include, for instance, the second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID II)150 and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR),151 both discussed 
below. The EU Regulation on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-
based investment products (PRIIPs Regulation),152 also discussed below, is not listed in the 
article 1(2) of the ESAs Regulations since it was enacted after the establishment of the ESAs 
but the list in this article includes a reference to ‘all directives, regulations, and decisions based 
on those acts, and of any further legally binding Union act which confers tasks on the 
Authority.’  
 
Alternatively, temporary product intervention is permitted where there is an emergency 
situation.153 According to article 18 of the ESAs Regulations, an emergency situation may 
emerge where adverse developments may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the 
EU. In that case, the ESA, the European Commission or the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) can request the Council to adopt a decision addressed to the ESA, determining the 
existence of an emergency situation. The decision is made in consultation with the Commission 
and the ESRB and, where appropriate, the ESAs. 
 
The intervention powers of the ESAs are temporary and therefore if permanent bans or 
prohibitions of specific products or financial activities needed to be made, they would need to 
be effected by NCAs. Accordingly, the ESA’s decision to use its intervention power has to be 
reviewed in appropriate intervals and at least every 3 months and if not renewed within that 
timeframe it automatically expires.154 A Member State can request the relevant ESA to reconsider 
its decision and in that case the latter has to follow a specified procedure.155  
 
Despite the potential for intervention by the ESAs, directly or through the NCAs, it is to be 
noted that the realm of the ESAs is confined to the micro-prudential level. Therefore, the 
ultimate leading force in preventing and mitigating systemic risks to financial stability within 
the EU is the ESRB. The ESRB is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the financial 
system within the EU in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to 
financial stability in the EU that arise from developments within the financial system and taking 
into account macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods of widespread financial 
                                                
150 Council Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and amending Directive 
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, 349–496. 
151 Council Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2014] OJ L 173/84. It is envisaged that by January 2018 MiFID and MiFIR will 
apply within the Member States. The limited application of the powers of Article 9(5) that is currently confined 
to a few legislative acts was highlighted in the European Commission Review of the ESAs and it was suggested 
to give consideration to converting Article 9(5) into a self-standing empowerment. See European Commission, 
Report from the Commissionto the European Parliament and the Council on the Operation of European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), Brussels 8th August 
2014, COM (2014) 509 final, available electronically at http://eur-
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(accessed 15.09.2017), 8. 
152 Council Regulation (EU) 1286/2014 of 26 November 2014 on Key Information Documents for Packaged Retail 
and Insurance-based Investment Products [2014] OJ L 352/1. 
153 Article 18 of the ESAs Regulations.  
154 Article 9(5) of the ESAs Regulations. 
155 Article 9(5) of the ESAs Regulation. The procedure is set out in the second subparagraph of Article 44(1) of the 
ESAs Regulation. 
distress.156 When significant risks to the achievement of the ESRB macroprudential objective 
are identified, the ESRB can provide warnings and, where appropriate, issue recommendations 
for remedial action.157 The warnings or recommendation can be addressed in particular to the 
EU as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the ESAs, or to one or 
more of the NCAs. The ESRB warnings or recommendations are backed by a ‘comply or 
explain’ mechanism as set out in Article 17 of the ESRB Regulation. In addition, the ESRB 
can decide on a case-by-case basis to make a warning or recommendation public.158  
 
Thus, in a cat bond scenario, if the ESRB were to consider that the cat bonds market had grown 
sufficiently and were sufficiently interconnected to pose a real systemic threat, it might want 
to issue a recommendation for action to be taken. For instance, it could recommend that any 
models used in structuring new cat bond issues be audited by independent third parties in order 
to ensure that they are robust, taking into account available contextual knowledge,159 and in 
order to have assurances from a diversity of sources as to the soundness of the risk-pricing.  
 
The ESRB is likely therefore to be the driving force in ensuring macroprudential concerns in 
the EU are taken into account and acted upon. This can be achieved, inter alia, through the 
ESAs’ product intervention powers or through product intervention powers given at Member 
State level (as discussed under Heading D.1). In addition, under recent EU legislation, NCAs 
in the UK, including the FPC160 and the PRA, and not just the FCA may be able to make use of 
product intervention powers for macroprudential purposes. These include the MiFIR, the 
PRIIPs Regulation and the Regulation on over-the-counter (OTC) Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories (EMIR).161  
 
 
D.2.2 Product Intervention Powers under MiFIR  
 
On 12 June 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a new legislative package 
that included MiFID II and MiFIR. The legislation applies, inter alia, to investment firms and 
credit institutions when providing investment services and/or performing investment 
activities.162  
 
Article 2(1)(a) of MiFID II excludes from the application of MiFID II insurance undertakings 
or undertakings carrying out the reinsurance and retrocession activities referred to in the 
Solvency II Directive, when carrying out the activities referred to in that Directive. Although 
this would exclude the application to insurance and reinsurance undertakings of authorisation 
                                                
156 Article 3 of the ESRB Regulation.  
157 Article 16 of the ESRB Regulation. 
158 Article 18 of the ESRB Regulation.  
159 See text accompanying n 74. 
160 As a Committee of the Bank of England, the FPC can be considered as a competent authority for certain directives 
and regulations. See Letter of the HM Treasury to the European Commission on the 29th of April 2013, available 
electronically at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210034/Notification_of_competent
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and Trade Repositories. 
161 Council Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 
(EMIR) [2012] L OJ 20/1.  
162 Authorised under MiFID II and Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on Access to the Activity of 
Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms [2013] OJ 
176/338, respectively. Article 1(2) of MiFIR. 
and operating conditions for investment firms laid down in MiFID II, it would not appear in 
itself to affect the scope of product intervention powers in MiFIR. However there are 
suggestions elsewhere that a restriction imposed by the exercise of MiFIR product intervention 
powers may not be addressed to an insurance undertaking. 163 Even if this is the case, such 
restrictions may presumably be addressed to structuring agents and/or distributors listed in the 
MiFID investment firms register.164 Further, product intervention under MiFIR could 
presumably also lead to intervention in the secondary markets for cat bonds. The limitation of 
the power to address product intervention only to specific types of entities lies awkwardly with 
the purposes of product intervention, which relate to addressing issues in the design and 
distribution of products regardless of the class of entity that designed, sponsored or distributed 
them. If coverage of entities is not sufficiently comprehensive, that would immediately result 
in regulatory arbitrage.165 
 
The product intervention powers within the scope of MiFIR apply to financial instruments.166 A 
financial instrument is an asset or evidence of the ownership of an asset, or a contractual 
agreement between two parties to receive or deliver another financial instrument. Instruments 
considered as financial are listed in MiFID II (Annex I).167 Pursuant to Section C(1) of the Annex 
financial instruments include transferable securities. Article 4(1)(44) of MiFID II includes a 
definition of transferable securities which covers bonds.168 Importantly for our purposes, it 
should therefore cover also catastrophe bonds.  
 
In addition, cat-linked futures, swaps and options would be classified as “derivatives”, and would 
therefore also fall within the ambit of MiFIR. The definition of derivatives is common to both 
MiFID II and MiFIR.169 Derivatives are defined in Article 2(1)(29) of MiFIR as ‘any other 
securities (i.e. other than transferable securities, including shares, bonds or other forms of 
securitised debt), giving the right to acquire or sell any such transferable securities or giving rise 
to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities, currencies, interest rates 
or yields, commodities or other indices or measures.’ Annex I Section C (10) of MiFID II lists 
among the types of derivatives to which it is applicable, ‘options, futures, swaps, forward rate 
agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to climatic variables, … that must be 
settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of the parties other than by reason 
                                                
163 Indeed in the Frequently Asked Questions on MiFIR Product Intervention Powers it is indicated that ‘The 
entities to which these powers can be applied are firms authorised under Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID) and 
credit institutions (i.e. banks) authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD).’ Frequently Asked Questions on 
MiFIR Product Intervention Powers, available electronically at www.esma.europa.eu/policy-activities/mifid-ii-
and-investor-protection/mifir-product-intervention-powers (accessed 10.09.2017).  
164 available electronically at https://registers.esma.europa.eu/publication/searchMifid (accessed 10.09.2017). 
165 On 12th January 2017, ESMA delivered an opinion calling for a modification of the scope of the powers of the 
National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and ESMA under Articles 40 and 42 of MiFIR. ESMA stated that ‘… the 
way the scope of the intervention powers is designed under MiFIR could create a risk of arbitrage between MiFID 
firms and fund management companies …ESMA is very concerned about this risk of arbitrage because it could 
reduce the impact of future measures by leaving outside the scope of the restrictions entities performing similar 
activities or distributing funds directly, as well as creating competitive distortions.’ ESMA, Opinion: Impact of the 
exclusion of fund management companies from the scope of the MiFIR Intervention Powers, 12th January 2017, 
ESMA50-1215332076-23, available electronically at www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-
1215332076-23_opinion_mifir_intervention_powers.pdf (accessed 01.09.2017).  
166 Articles 40-42 of MiFIR. 
167 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the document Commission Delegated 
Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to Definitions, Transparency, Portfolio Compression and Supervisory Measures on Product Intervention and 
Positions C (2016) 2860 final, 61. 
168 Article 4(1)(44)(b) MiFID II. 
169 Article 2(1)(29) MiFIR and Article 4(49) of MiFID II. 
of default or other termination event….’. 170 
 
Given that cat bonds as well as cat-linked derivatives fall within the scope of MiFIR, it is useful 
to examine the product intervention powers conferred by MiFIR, as these can be used to regulate 
their design and distribution. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of MiFIR, broadly share the same wording 
and empower the ESMA, the EBA (with respect to structured deposits) and NCAs respectively 
temporarily to prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial 
instruments or financial instruments with certain specified features or a type of financial activity 
or practice. The discretion of the EBA and ESMA is confined and requires that the following 
conditions are cumulatively met:  
 
(a) The proposed action addresses a significant investor protection concern or a threat to the 
orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets (or commodity markets in relation 
to ESMA and NCA) or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the 
EU;171 
(b) The regulatory requirements under EU law that are applicable to the relevant financial 
instrument or activity do not address the threat;  
(c) A competent authority or competent authorities have not taken action to address the 
threat or the actions that have been taken do not adequately address the threat. 
 
In addition, when taking action the ESMA or the EBA has to ensure that the action does not have 
a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets or on investors that is disproportionate 
to the benefits of the action and that it does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage.172 Before 
deciding to take any action, the ESMA or the EBA is required to notify competent authorities of 
the action it proposes.173 
 
Given that cat-linked derivatives, including futures, swaps and options very probably fall 
within the ambit of MiFIR, EMIR would also apply to such cat-bond derived instruments.174 
One of the key implications of this would be that certain information relating to transactions in 
these derivatives will be available to the entities on which MIFIR confers product intervention 
powers, because EMIR introduces a mandatory requirement to report certain details of 
derivative transactions in the EU to trade repositories.175 So information on the risks inherent in 
derivatives markets will be centrally stored and easily accessible to the relevant competent 
authorities.176 Under EMIR ESMA as the sole authority with the responsibility to register and 
exercise surveillance of trade repositories in the EU,177 can ensure an unfettered access to all 
the relevant European authorities, including the ESRB, to the data stored in the trade 
                                                
170 This is reinforced by Commission Delegated Regulation Supplementing MiFID II OJ C(2016) 2398 final. See 
Article 8(e). 
171 Where the conditions set out in the first subparagraph are fulfilled, EBA may impose the prohibition or restriction 
referred to in paragraph 1 on a precautionary basis before a structured deposit has been marketed, distributed or sold 
to clients. According to Article 42(2) that relates to NCA product intervention, there reference is to the stability of 
the whole or part of the financial system in the Union within at least one member state.  
172 Articles 40(3), 41(3) and 42(3) of MiFIR. There is another condition with regard to the ESMA intervention 
powers to consult the public bodies competent for the oversight, administration and regulation of physical 
agricultural markets under Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, where the measure relates to agricultural commodities 
derivatives. 
173 Articles 40(4) or 41(4) of MiFIR. 
174 Article 2(5) of EMIR defines ‘derivative’ a financial instrument as set out in points (4) to (10) of Section C of 
Annex I to MiFID 1 (this definition is similar to the one in MiFID 2).  
175 EMIR, Article 9.  
176 EMIR, Article 81. 
177 EMIR, Title VI Registration and Supervision of Trade Repositories, Chapter 1.  
repositories and can act as the European contact point to deal with competent authorities of 
third countries trade repositories.178 The information disclosed under EMIR is important for 
macroprudential supervision and will give authorities with product intervention powers the 
macro picture of how these products are being used and distributed.179 
 
With regard to the product intervention powers of the NCA, the requirements are:  
 
(a) either  
(i) a financial instrument, structured deposit or activity or practice gives rise to 
significant investor protection concerns or poses a threat to the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or commodity markets or to the stability of whole 
or part of the financial system within at least one Member State; or  
(ii) a derivative has a detrimental effect on the price formation mechanism in the 
underlying market; 180 
(b) existing regulatory requirements under EU law applicable to the financial instrument, 
structured deposit or activity or practice do not sufficiently address the risks referred to 
in point (a) and the issue would not be better addressed by improved supervision or 
enforcement of existing requirements;  
(c) the action is proportionate taking into account the nature of the risks identified, the level 
of sophistication of investors or market participants concerned and the likely effect of 
the action on investors and market participants who may hold, use or benefit from the 
financial instrument, structured deposit or activity or practice;  
(d) the competent authority has properly consulted competent authorities in other Member 
States that may be significantly affected by the action;  
(e) the action does not have a discriminatory effect on services or activities provided from 
another Member State; and  
(f) it has properly consulted public bodies competent for the oversight, administration and 
regulation of physical agricultural markets under Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007, where 
a financial instrument or activity or practice poses a serious threat to the orderly 
functioning and integrity of the physical agricultural market. 
 
Several observations can be made with regard to these temporary product intervention powers. 
First, a pre-requisite for the exercise of the intervention power where it relates to the orderly 
functioning and integrity of financial/commodity markets or stability of the financial system is 
the existence of a “threat”. In contrast, where it is being exercised for investor protection 
purposes, there needs to be a “significant concern”. According to the ESMA, the latter requires 
the existence of a more intense detriment before the intervention power can be used.181 This 
reflects the priority given to financial stability as an objective.182 
                                                
178 The European Data Protection Supervisor has also raised concerns regarding the vast powers entrusted with the 
ESMA.See also the FSA and HM Treasury, Reforming OTC Derivatives Markets, A UK Perspective, December 
2009, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/reform_otc_derivatives.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017). 
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180 Where the conditions set out in the first subparagraph are fulfilled, the competent authority may impose the 
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structured deposit has been marketed, distributed or sold to clients. 
181 ESMA, ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, Final Report, 19 December 2014, 
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182 See, for instance, Schoenmaker and Wierts, (n 1), who suggest constructing hierarchy of objectives in which the 
 
Second, the European Commission has adopted delegated acts (following a technical advice by 
the EBA and the ESMA) to identify the considerations to be taken into account by the EBA, the 
ESMA or an NCA in determining when, such significant concern or a threat (depending on the 
area of intervention) exist.183 The long list of criteria includes, for instance, the complexity of the 
product or activity, the potential for detrimental consequences, the type of clients involved and 
the degree of transparency.184 The criteria seem to be mostly orientated towards the investor 
protection objective but some were clearly drafted with financial stability considerations in mind. 
For instance, whether there is a high risk of disruption to systemically important institutions; 
whether the instrument or activity presents risks to payment, settlement or clearing systems; or 
whether it may threaten investors’ confidence in the financial system. 
 
Third, according to articles 40(7) and 41(7) the intervention action adopted by the EBA or the 
ESMA prevails over any previous action taken by a competent authority. The EBA and the 
ESMA are required to notify the NCA and publish a notice on its website.185 
 
Fourth, the NCAs are subject to more onerous conditions than the EBA and the ESMA before 
they can use their temporary intervention powers including the requirement that the issue would 
not be better addressed by improved supervision or enforcement of existing requirements; that 
the action is proportionate; the requirement to consult with competent authorities that might be 
affected by their proposed intervention action and that the action does not have a discriminatory 
effect on services or activities provided from another Member State. Some of these conditions 
similarly appear in the intervention power of the NCAs under the PRIIPs Regulation and will be 
further explored in the following section. The NCAs need to provide at least a month’s notice to 
the ESMA and other authorities when taking a temporary action.186  
 
Finally, the EBA and the ESMA play a facilitation and coordination role in ensuring that action 
taken by a NCA is justified and proportionate and that where appropriate, a consistent approach 
is taken by competent authorities. In practical terms, the ESMA or the EBA are required to issue 
an opinion on whether the prohibition or restriction is justified and proportionate and whether 
similar action by other competent authorities is required.187 Nevertheless, where NCA has taken 
a measure under Article 42, the ESMA or the EBA may take any of the measures referred to in 
Article 40(1) and 41(1) respectively without issuing the opinion provided for in Article 43. 
                                                
macroprudential concerns override the micro-prudential concerns. Similarly, see C Noyer, ‘Macroprudential Policy: 
From Theory to Implementation’ Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 18 April 2014, 11.  
183 Article 40(8) and 42(7) of MiFIR; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) of 25 of April 2016 supplementing 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Organisational Requirements and 
Operating Conditions for Investment Firms and Defined terms for the purposes of that Directive C (2016) 2398 
final (hereinafter: the Delegated Regulation). 
184 Article 19 to 21 of the Delegated Regulation. The Delegated Regulation (recital 19) clarifies that the need to 
assess all criteria and factors that could be present in a specific factual situation should not prevent NCAs, ESMA 
and the EBA from using a temporary intervention power when only one of the factors or criteria leads to such a 
concern or threat. 
185 Articles 40 and 41(4) and (5) of MiFIR. 
186 Article 42(3) of MiFIR. Nevertheless, according to Article 42(3) - in exceptional cases where the competent 
authority deems it necessary to take urgent action under this Article in order to prevent detriment arising from the 
financial instruments, structured deposits, practices or activities referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authority 
may take action on a provisional basis with no less than 24 hours’ written notice, before the measure is intended to 
take effect, to all other competent authorities and ESMA or, for structured deposits, EBA, provided that all the 
criteria in this Article are met and that, in addition, it is clearly established that a one month notification period 
would not adequately address the specific concern or threat. The competent authority shall not take action on a 
provisional basis for a period exceeding three months. 
187 Article 43 of the MiFIR. 
 
The above discussion demonstrates that a UK NCA would be able to exercise product 
intervention powers conferred by EU rather than by UK law in furtherance of the financial 
stability objective, subject to the conditions stated in MiFIR. These powers should be seen as 
additional to those conferred by UK law, and excercisable independently of those conferred by 
FSMA or BEA, however the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, depending on what is 
decided regarding the survival of the acquis communautaire in the UK, may mean that in order 
that these powers be preserved, UK legislative action will be necessary. 
 
 
D.2.3 Data informing the exercise of product intervention powers: product governance under 
MiFID II 
 
The decision to exercise product intervention powers can be a difficult one for supervisors as 
explained under heading C and they are likely to be reluctant to intervene in the absence of 
compelling evidence of the need to do so. The availability of data about relevant products is 
therefore key. Article 16(3) and Article 24(2) of MiFID II introduced product governance 
obligations for manufacturers and distributors.188 Product governance is aimed at strengthening 
the level of investor protection across the Union and reinforcing the confidence in financial 
markets.189 While not specifically required for the purpose of gauging systemic significance, 
compliance with these obligations will generate data that will be useful for macroprudential 
oversight and potentially, the decision whether to exercise product intervention powers. For 
instance, article 16(3) requires an investment firm that manufactures financial instruments to 
make available to any distributor all appropriate information on the financial instrument and the 
product approval process, including the identified target market of the financial instrument.  The 
guidelines further specify the criteria for identification of the potential target market by 
manufacturers. The criteria include data on the financial situation of the target clients with a 
focus on the ability to bear losses as well as risk tolerance (i.e., the general attitude that target 
clients should have in relation to the risks of investment).190 These considerations could be useful 
in analysing build-up of risks related to the use of a specific financial product and thus of interest 
to the macroprudential supervisor.  
 
 
D.2.4 PRIIPs Regulation 
 
The PRIIPs Regulation took effect on 1 January 2018. It defines packaged retail and insurance-
based investment products (PRIIPs) as including both packaged retail investment products 
(PRIP) and insurance-based investment products.191 The former are defined as ‘an investment, 
                                                
188 Manufacturer according to Recital 15 and Article 9(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive is a firm that 
manufactures an investment product, including the creation, development, issuance or design of that product, 
including when advising corporate issuers on the launch of a new product; Distributer according to Recital 15 and 
Article 10(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive is a firm that offers, recommends or sells an investment product 
and service to a client. The obligations are further specified in Articles 9 and 10 of Commission Delegated Directive 
(EU) 2017/593, the MiFID II Delegated Directive 
189 ESMA, Guidelines on MiFID II Product Governance Requirements, Final Report, 2nd June 2017 available 
electronically at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma35-43-
620_report_on_guidelines_on_product_governance.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017) (hereinafter ESMA 2017 PG 
Report), Part 3, [1].  
190 ESMA 2017 PG Report (n 189), Part 5.  
191 Article 4(3) of the PRIIPs Regulation; Council Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on Markets in Financial 
Instruments, as amended, OJ L 145. 
including instruments issued by special purpose vehicles192 or securitisation special purpose 
entities,193 where, regardless of the legal form of the investment, the amount repayable to the 
retail investor is subject to fluctuations because of exposure to reference values or to the 
performance of one or more assets which are not directly purchased by the retail investor’;194 the 
latter as ‘an insurance product which offers a maturity or surrender value and where that maturity 
or surrender value is wholly or partially exposed, directly or indirectly, to market fluctuations’.195  
 
The question whether cat bonds would classify as PRIIPs is not an easy one to answer. First of 
all, the FCA notes that  
 
‘[i]dentifying whether a particular product is a PRIIP may not be straightforward as the 
concept of “exposure to reference values” is wide. In some cases, you will need to 
consider the specific terms of a product before determining whether or not it is a 
PRIIP.’196  
 
It is suggested that catastrophe bonds do not fall within the definition of insurance-based 
investment products, as, even though they are insurance-based, catastrophe bonds are not subject 
to market fluctuations since they are linked to a catastrophe event rather than the stock market 
or economic conditions. However, arguably catastrophe bonds do fall within the definition of 
PRIP. First of all, it is to be noted that this definition makes reference to the definition of ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ found in the Solvency II Directive, which is as follows: 
 
‘“[S]pecial purpose vehicle” means any undertaking, whether incorporated or not, other 
than an existing insurance or reinsurance undertaking, which assumes risks from insur-
ance or reinsurance undertakings and which fully funds its exposure to such risks 
through the proceeds of a debt issuance or any other financing mechanism where the 
repayment rights of the providers of such debt or financing mechanism are subordinated 
to the reinsurance obligations of such an undertaking.’197 
 
As explained under Heading B, the amount repayable to the investor in a parametric cat bond 
depends on whether relevant catastrophes fall at or above a certain reference value on the index 
to which the cat bond is linked. Similarly, in an industry-loss cat bond, the amount repayable 
depends on the losses experienced by the insurance industry following a catastrophe (the industry 
losses being the reference value). Both these types of cat bond may be seen as falling under the 
first alternative within the definition of PRIP. An indemnity cat bond, for its part, could fall 
under the second alternative within the definition, as the investors who buy cat bonds will not be 
a party to the underlying insurance contract (i.e. they are not directly incurring the liability, as 
insurers, to indemnify the assured for a covered loss).198  
 
                                                
192 as defined in Article 13 (26) of the Solvency II Directive. 
193 as defined in Article 4(1) (an) of the Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and 
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1). 
194 ibid, Article 4(1) of PRIIPs Regulation.  
195 ibid, Article 4(2) of PRIIPs Regulation.  
196 FCA, PRIIPs disclosure: Key Information Documents, First published: 3rd December 2015; Last updated: 12th 
May 2017, available electronically at https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/priips-disclosure-key-information-documents 
(accessed 14.09.2017). 
197 Article 13(26) of the Solvency II Directive. 
198 While it should be pointed out that in insurance-linked securities, it is the insurer’s liabilities which are securitised 
(and not assets), as this provision is designed to cover insurance-based investments, it is difficult to see what it could 
have been referring to if the word “assets” was meant to exclude securitised liabilities. 
Without distinguishing between products offered to retail and institutional investors respectively 
Chapter III of the PRIIPs Regulation gives EIOPA and NCAs monitoring powers over PRIIPs199 
and product intervention powers.200 Article 16 of PRIIPs Regulation empowers EIOPA 
temporarily to prohibit or restrict in the EU: (a) the marketing, distribution or sale of certain 
insurance-based investment products or insurance-based investment products with certain 
specified features or (b) a type of financial activity or practice of an insurance or reinsurance 
undertaking. The conditions that need to be fulfilled are identical to the ones required of EBA 
and ESMA in MiFIR in order to fulfil their product intervention powers, as outlined under 
heading D.2.2 above. While as explained, cat bonds would not fall under the definition of 
“insurance-based investment products”, the issue of a PRIP is likely to be considered “a type of 
financial activity or practice of an insurance undertaking”, thereby qualifying to be the object of 
product intervention under Article 16. 
 
Article 17 of the PRIIPs Regulation empowers NCAs to prohibit or restrict the following in or 
from its Member State: (a) the marketing, distribution or sale of insurance-based investment 
products or insurance-based investment products with certain specified features; or (b) a type of 
financial activity or practice of an insurance or reinsurance undertaking.  
 
For the intervention power to be exercised five conditions must be met:  
 
(a) an insurance-based investment product, or activity or practice gives rise to significant 
investor protection concerns or poses a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of 
financial markets or the stability of whole or part of the financial system within at least 
one Member State; 201 
(b) existing regulatory requirements under Union law applicable to the insurance-based 
investment product, or activity or practice do not sufficiently address the risks referred to 
in point (a) and the issue would not be better addressed by improved supervision or 
enforcement of existing requirements;  
(c) the action is proportionate taking into account the nature of the risks identified, the level 
of sophistication of investors or market participants concerned and the likely effect of the 
action on investors and market participants who may hold, use or benefit from the 
insurance-based investment product, or activity or practice;  
(d) The competent authority has properly consulted competent authorities in other Member 
States that may be significantly affected by the action; and  
(e) The action does not have a discriminatory effect on services or activities provided from 
another Member State. 
 
In addition, the competent authority cannot impose a prohibition or restriction under Article 17 
unless, not less than one month before the measure is intended to take effect, it has notified all 
other competent authorities involved and EIOPA in writing or through another medium agreed 
between the authorities of the details of:202 the insurance-based investment product, or activity 
                                                
199 Article 15 of the PRIIPs Regulation. 
200 Articles 16 and 17 of the PRIIPs Regulation. 
201 Where the conditions set out in the first subparagraph are fulfilled, the competent authority may impose the 
prohibition or restriction referred to in paragraph 1 on a precautionary basis before an insurance-based 
investment product has been marketed or sold to investors.  
202 Nevertheless, according to Article 17(4) ‘In exceptional cases where the competent authority deems it necessary 
to take urgent action under this Article in order to prevent detriment arising from the insurance-based investment 
products, activities or practices referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authority may take action on a provisional 
basis with no less than 24 hours' written notice before the measure is intended to take effect to all other competent 
authorities and EIOPA, provided that all the criteria in this Article are met and that, in addition, it is clearly 
established that a one-month notification period would not adequately address the specific concern or threat. The 
or practice to which the proposed action relates; the precise nature of the proposed prohibition 
or restriction and when it is intended to take effect; and the evidence upon which it has based its 
decision and upon which it is satisfied that each of the required conditions are met. The NCA is 
required to publish a notice on its website of a decision to impose a prohibition or restriction.203 
 
EIOPA provided its Technical Advice, as requested by the Commission, on measures specifying 
the criteria and factors to be taken into account in determining when there is a significant investor 
protection concern or a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to 
the stability of the whole or part of the financial system of the Union or to the stability of the 
financial system within at least one Member State.204 According to the Technical Advice, the 
criteria should include, inter alia, the complexity of the product or activity, the size of the 
potential problem or detriment, the types of investors involved and the degree of transparency.205 
Under the risk to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets factor, the Technical 
Advice outlines more detailed elements to be considered, for example, whether activities or 
practices pose a particularly high risk to the resilience or smooth operation of markets; a product 
or practice or activity poses particular risks to the market or payment systems infrastructure; and 
it would threaten the investors’ confidence in the financial system.206 
 
Several observations can be made.  
 
First, Member States are required to designate the competent authorities responsible for the 
supervision of the compliance with the PRIIPs Regulation.207 The competent authority for that 
purpose in the UK is the FCA.208 There are however differences in the powers assigned to the 
FCA in the FSMA and in the PRIIPs Regulation. Article 17 of the PRIIPs Regulation refers to 
the competent authority power to prohibit or restrict ‘in or from the member states’. This means 
that the power assigned in the PRIIPs Regulation extends to activities of firms passporting into 
or from that Member State. In other words, the PRIIPs extends beyond the FCA power as 
assigned to it in the FSMA increasing its competence and jurisdiction. Second, similar to the 
facilitation and coordination role of the ESMA and EBA under MiFIR, EIOPA is required to 
issue an opinion, published on EIOPA website, whether it considers the action taken by the NCA 
to be justified and proportionate. Where a competent authority proposes to take, or takes, action 
contrary to an opinion adopted by EIOPA or declines to take action contrary to such an opinion, 
it is required to immediately publish on its website a notice fully explaining its reasons for doing 
so.209 
 
Third, the PRIIPs Regulation appears to be mainly geared towards not financial stability 
concerns but rather investor protection.210 These objectives are normally complementary, but at 
                                                
competent authority shall not take action on a provisional basis for a period exceeding three months.’ 
203 Article 17(5) of the PRIIPs Regulation. 
204 EIOPA, Technical Advice on criteria and factors to be taken into account in applying product intervention 
powers, 29 June 2015 available electronically at 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Opinions/Technical%20Advice%20on%20certain%20product%20interventio
n%20criteria%28published%29.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017) (hereinafter EIOPA 2015 TA). 
205 This is not the full list of criteria. EIOPA emphasises in the preamble to the Technical Advice that Criteria and 
factors should be non-exhaustive.  
206 EIOPA 2015 TA (n 204), paragraphs c, e and f of section 7.  
207 Preamble para 10. See also Article 4(8) of the PRIIPs Regulation. 
208 See FCA, Changes to disclosure rules in the FCA Handbook to reflect the direct application of PRIIPs 
Regulation, Consultation Paper CP16/18, July 2016, available electronically at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp16-18.pdf (accessed 14.09.2017).  
209 Article 18 of the PRIIPs Regulation. 
210 As indicated in the Preamble of the PRIIPs Regulation, for instance at para 40 of the Preamble: ‘Since the 
times may conflict. For instance, the requirement to consider the level of investor sophistication 
could be problematic when the desire to intervene is prompted by financial stability concerns.  
Even sophisticated investors (who may be deemed capable of protecting themselves if 
appropriate disclosure has been made),211 are subject to skewed incentives, cognitive biases and 
herd behaviours. In other words, just because they are sophisticated it does not mean that their 
actions are less likely to endanger financial stability. In fact, the evidence from the 2008-2009 
financial crisis would seem to suggest just the opposite.212  
 
Nevertheless, like the MiFIR, the PRIIPs Regulation may provide NCAs in the UK with tools 
for product intervention where financial stability concerns arise which are related to the design 
or distribution of cat bonds, and the same considerations arise with respect to the potential 
consequences of EU withdrawal as were raised above under Heading D.2.2. In view of the fact 
that the UK does not take a sectoral approach to financial regulation, should the decision be taken 
to transpose these powers into UK law as a result of EU law ceasing to apply in the UK, the 
respective product intervention powers conferred by PRIIPs and MiFIR could be merged and re-
enacted as powers supplementary to those already conferred by FSMA and BEA. 
 
 
E. Concluding Remarks 
 
From being niche and custom-designed financial instruments cat bonds are becoming more 
common and commoditized as the need to turn to the capital markets to absorb catastrophe risks 
becomes more evident and as the popularity of these instruments increases due to the high yield 
they offer. A number of features of the design and distribution of these financial instruments may 
in future render them systemically relevant. The pricing of catastrophe risks is far from 
straightforward and the increasing frequency and size of weather events in recent years suggests 
that caution should be exercised in originating and transferring financial risks correlated to these 
events. Yet, in view of the popularity of these products, there is the possibility that a market of 
risk origination will evolve that underprices catastrophe risks, passing them on to investors who 
lack the ability to price them correctly. An over-reliance on models, without supplementing them 
with calculative practices that draw upon contextual knowledge, 213 can increase the “surprise 
factor” when a catastrophe strikes and the extent of the loss becomes evident. Also, a number of 
cat-linked derivatives are beginning to be traded in the markets, with the potential to multiply 
exponentially the financial impact of a catastrophic event. There is the potential for significant 
common exposures to develop, which, should widespread and significant losses occur, may 
engender panic in the financial markets. So while the alternative risk transfer function that cat 
                                                
objectives of this Regulation, namely to enhance retail investor protection and improve retail investor confidence 
in PRIIPs, including where those products are sold cross-border, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States but can rather, by reason of its effects, be better achieved at Union level….’ 
211 Though it should be noted that the 2007-2009 financial crisis suggests that even disclosure requirements did not 
have the desired effect: S M Davidoff and C A Hill, ‘Limits of Disclosure’ (2013) 36 Seattle University Law Review, 
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213 See Jarzabkowski (n 74), 180-181. 
bonds perform can be extremely beneficial in distributing and managing existing risks, the design 
and distribution of these products must be monitored with care in order to ensure that a beneficial 
innovation is not hijacked by a desire to speculate which poses a threat to financial stability. 
 
Catastrophe bonds may not pose an immediate systemic risk at the time of writing but it is the 
build-up of systemic risk that should be monitored and mitigated by macroprudential 
supervisors. Avoiding box-ticking in supervisory practices is key to effective supervision. Thus, 
whilst the question whether cat bond markets are systemically important should take into account 
size, interconnectedness and substitutability, it should also consider other factors, including 
complexity and opacity or investor complacency as these products become more standardised 
and “cookie-cutter”. Product intervention could provide an effective tool in the armoury of 
macroprudential supervisors to address any consequent risks.  
  
While bearing in mind that product intervention powers are new and largely untested, this paper 
suggests that, in view of the potential systemic relevance of the product itself and its distribution, 
the right way to address these risks may be through the exercise of product intervention powers 
rather than by other regulatory means. The paper also examines the scope and content of product 
intervention powers that may be exercised in the UK, both powers conferred by UK law as well 
as powers conferred by EU law. The examination of these powers reveals a complex and 
fragmented landscape of varying approaches. Product intervention powers are currently hedged 
around with various conditions and requirements that need to be met prior to their exercise. 
While these obstacles are mainly the result of an attempt to achieve a workable balance between 
permitting innovation in response to market demand and precluding developments that are 
harmful to the interests of investors and/or pose a threat to financial stability, the various hurdles 
which need to be overcome before a product intervention power may be exercised in furtherance 
of the financial stability objective may reduce regulators’ appetite to exercise these powers, 
especially if the justification does not involve the protection of consumers but a more vague and 
uncertain threat to the financial system as a whole.  
 
Nevertheless, the availability of the powers arguably leaves open to the financial authorities an 
additional macroprudential tool that can be wielded in appropriate circumstances, where the 
better-known macroprudential tools such as capital buffers and loan-to-value ratio limits are 
unsuitable for the task at hand. Should the powers conferred by EU law be repealed pursuant to 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, careful consideration should be given to whether what is left 
is sufficient for macroprudential purposes, or whether additional powers need to be built into the 
UK regulatory framework.  
 
The implications of our findings extend much beyond the systemic risk impact of cat bonds or 
more generally, ILS. They emphasise the need for macroprudential supervisors to have a varied 
array of tools and to apply them where appropriate. Macroprudential supervisors may suffer from 
inaction bias, particularly when expected to supervise innovative financial instruments. Of 
course, risk is essential to the efficient functioning of financial markets and ultimately, for 
economic growth. Still, where innovation threatens financial stability, this is exactly where the 
intervention of macroprudential supervisors is needed. We attempt to point out a way in which 
supervisors can be innovative and use available tools creatively to meet their financial stability 
objective. Whilst product intervention powers were designed primarily for investor protection, 
when the design, issuance, distribution and use of a product could have systemic risk 
implications, macroprudential supervisors could and should use this tool to address the risk.  
 
 
